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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1890's, in dealing with his adult female patients, Sigmund
Freud heard many complaints that the patients had been sexually
abused as children. Unable to believe that child sexual abuse was as
prevalent as the reports seemed to indicate, Freud concluded that
the reports were fantasies:
[T]here was the astonishing thing that in every case blame was laid on
perverse acts by the father, and realization of the unexpected fre-
quency of hysteria, in every case of which the same thing applied,
though it was hardly credible that perverse acts against children were
so general.'
For the next seventy-five years it was believed by society in gen-
eral, mental health professionals, social service agencies, physicians,
and the courts, that child sexual abuse was a rare occurrence. 2 "As
I S. FREUD, THE ORIGINS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS: LETrERS TO WILHELM FLIESs, DRAFrs
AND NOTES: 1887-1902, 215 (1954).
2 Herman & Hirschman, Father-Daughter Incest, 2 J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND Soc'Y
735 (1977), reprinted in THE SEXUAL VICTIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 97, 99 (L. Schultz ed. 1980);
Rosenfeld, Sexual Misuse and the Family, 2 VICTIMOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL J., 226, 227
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recently as ten years ago, [child] sexual abuse was regarded as ...
[an] uncommon problem."'3 In the mid-1970's, however, mental
health professionals and behavioral scientific researchers began to
publish alarming data indicating that child sexual abuse was much
more prevalent than had previously been believed.4 After the prob-
lem was brought to light, it was pushed further into the spotlight by
a coalition of two highly visible groups, the children's protection
movement and the women's movement.5 As the problem gained
notoriety, reports of child sexual abuse began to mushroom at a
much more rapid rate than reports of other forms of abuse. 6 By the
1980's, Freud's belief that it was "hardly credible that perverted acts
against children were so general" 7 had given way to the realization
that child sexual abuse was a societal problem of alarming
proportions.
Several extensive surveys have found that significant portions of
both the male and female populations of the United States were sex-
ually abused as children. The lowest percentage found for females
was eight percent," and for males three percent.9 More typically,
the percentages are in the range of twelve to twenty-two percent for
females 0 and five to six percent for males.1 ' One study found a
percentage as high as twenty-eight percent for females,' 2 and an-
other found a percentage as high as nine percent for males.13 While
the exact figures varied because of the populations surveyed, the
definitions used, and the sensitivity of the questions asked, the re-
(1977), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHIL-
DREN: SELECTED READINGS 91, 91-93 (1980).
3 D. FINKELHOR, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: NEW THEORY AND RESEARCH 1 (1984). For
example, in 1976 the number of cases of child sexual abuse reported to the nationwide
data collection systems of the American Humane Association was only 1,975. As public-
ity concerning the problem grew, so did reports-4,327 in 1977, 22,918 in 1982. Even
the latter figure is thought by most experts to be the proverbial "tip of the iceberg." Id.
4 Rosenfeld, supra note 2, at 230, 90-91.
5 D. FINKELHOR, supra note 3, at 3.
6 D. FINKELHOR, supra note 3, at 4.
7 S. FREUD, supra note 1, at 215.
8 Frity, Stoll, and Wagner, A Comparison of Males and Females Who Were Sexually Molested
as Children, 7J. SEx AND MARITAL THERAPY 54 (1981).
9 G. KERCHER, RESPONDING TO CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (1980).
10 D. FINKELHOR, supra note 3, at 1 (fifteen percent); D. FINKELHOR, SEXUALLY VICTIM-
IZED CHILDREN 55 (1979)(nineteen percent); Fromuth, The Long Term Psychological
Impact of Childhood Sexual Abuse, Ph.D. dissertation, Auburn University
(1983)(twenty-two percent); G. KERCHER, supra note 9 (twelve percent).
11 D. FINKELHOR, supra note 3 (six percent); Fritz, Stoll, and Wagner, supra note 8, at
54 (five percent).
12 Russell, The Incidence and Prevalence of Intrafamilial and Extrafamilial Sexual Abuse of
Female Children, 7 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 133 (1983).
13 D. FINKELHOR, SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHILDREN at 56 (1979).
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sults clearly establish, in the words of one of the foremost research-
ers in the field, "that sexual victimization occurs in the lives of an
important minority of all children."1 4 This researcher further calcu-
lates that even using the conservative figures that ten percent of all
girls and two percent of all boys are victims of sexual abuse, this
would mean that roughly 210,000 new cases of sexual abuse occur
every year. 15 Of these cases, only a small proportion, probably no
more than one-fifth, will ever be reported.'
6
Perhaps as startling as the dimensions of the problem is the
growing realization that children are much more likely to be abused
by someone they know than by a stranger. Although estimates on
this point, as on many others in the child abuse area, vary widely due
to the scanty data available, virtually all researchers agree that at
least fifty percent of the abuse is by persons known to the child. 17
Estimates range upward to eighty-five percent.' 8 Perhaps most dis-
quieting of all is the finding that the most likely abusers among the
persons children know are persons whom they know very well and
who have authority over them: relatives. 19 There is unanimous
agreement that most sexual abusers are male, 20 and that it is very




16 D. FINKELHOR, supra note 3, at 232; D. FINKELHOR, supra note 13, at 67.
17 De Vine, Sexual Abuse of Children: An Overview of the Problem, in U.S. DEP'T HEALTH &
HUM. SERVICES, SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN: SELECTED READINGS 5 (1980); Brant &
Tisza, The Sexually Misused Child, 47 AM.J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY, 80, 81-82 (1977); DeJong,
Hervada & Emmett, Epidemiologic Variations in Childhood Sexual Abuse, 7 CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT 153, 157 (1983); Summitt, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 177, 179, 182 (1983); Swift, Sexual Victimization of Children: An
Urban Mental Health Center Survey, 2 VICTIMOLOGY: AN INT'LJ., 322, 325 (1977), reprinted
in THE SEXUAL VICTIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 18, 22 (L. Schultz ed. 1980).
18 Berliner & Stevens, Advocatingfor Sexually Abused Children in the CriminalJustice System,
in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN: SELECTED
READINGS 47 (1980).
19 D. FINKELHOR, supra note 13, at 58; De Vine, supra note 17, at 5. See Burgess &
Holmstrom, Sexual Trauma of Children and Adolescents: Pressure, Sex, and Secrecy, 10 NURSING
CLINICS OF N. AM. 551, 552-53 (1975) reprinted in THE SEXUAL VICTIMOLOGY OF YOUTH
67, 69 (L. Schultz ed. 1980). "Relatives" here includes not only blood relatives, but
stepfathers (whether or not they have legally adopted the child) and live-in boyfriends of
the mother of the child.
20 Sgroi, Child Sexual Assault: Some Guidelines for Intervention and Assessment, in SEXUAL
ASSAULT OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 129, 133 (A. Burgess, A. Groth, L. Holmstrom
& S. Sgroi ed. 1978); Swift, supra note 17, at 322, 325.
21 Brant & Tisza, supra note 17, at 80, 81-82; Swift, Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syn-
drome, 7 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 177, 182 (1983); Swift, supra note 17, at 325.
Some researchers contend that "same generational" sexual activity, as between
brothers and sisters or cousins is the most common form of sexual activity for minors.
D. FINKELHOR, supra note 10, at 87, 89; THE SEXUAL VICTIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 26 (L.
Schultz ed. 1980). However, most researchers and the legal system have not focused on
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Estimates of the percentage of sexually abused children who are
abused by family members range from twenty-four percent 22 to fifty
percent. 23 With respect to abusers who are relatives, it is universally
recognized that the most likely abuser is a father figure, either the
biological father, a stepfather, or a live-in boyfriend of the mother.24
Estimates of the percentage of abuse by relatives that is perpetrated
by father figures range up to fifty percent.2 5 One of the most recent
estimates is that father-daughter abuse accounts for about one-third
of all childhood sexual abuse.26
In view of the increasing number of reported cases of child sex-
ual abuse and the accompanying perception that child sexual abuse
is a major social problem, it is not surprising that in the late 1970's
prosecutors began criminal proceedings against alleged abusers
with increased vigor. One of the tools that prosecutors have in-
creasingly sought to use during the last five years in their effort to
obtain convictions is expert testimony regarding the psychology of
the child complainant. Prosecutors have tried to use this testimony
in four ways. The first is offering an expert diagnosis that the com-
plainant is a victim of child sexual abuse, to prove that the abuse
occurred. 27 The second is the use of experts to vouch for the com-
plainant's credibility regarding the sexual abuse allegation. 28 The
third is offering expert testimony to enhance the complainant's
credibility by explaining the "unusual" behavior of the complainant
that the defendant has highlighted.2 9 The fourth is using an expert
to enhance the complainant's credibility by explaining the capabili-
ties of children as witnesses. 30 It is the purpose of this article to
explore whether courts have allowed these uses of expert testimony,
and whether they should be allowed. The article will examine each
of the four uses of expert testimony through a three-step process.
this type of behavior, perhaps because as long as the participants are relatively close in
age, it is viewed more as mutual experimentation than abuse of one participant by the
other.
22 DeJong, Hervada & Emmett, supra note 17, at 157.
23 De Vine, supra note 17; Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 19, at 551, 69.
24 1. STUART &J. GREER, VICTIMS OF SEXUAL AGGRESSION: TREATMENT OF CHILDREN,
WOMEN, AND MEN 58 (1984); Herman & Hirschman, supra note 2, at 735; Nelson, The
Impact of Incest, in CHILDREN AND SEX 163, 166 (L. Constantine & F. Martinson ed. 1981);
Tsai, Feldman-Summers & Edgar, Childhood Molestation: Differential Impacts on Psychosexual
Functioning, 88 J. OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 407 (1979), reprinted in CHILDREN AND SEX
206 (L. Constantine & F. Martinson ed. 1981).
25 See Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 19, at 551, 69.
26 See D. FINKELHOR, supra note 3, at 227.
27 See supra text accompanying notes 44-134 and 192-216.
28 See supra text accompanying notes 215-295.
29 See supra text accompanying notes 296-317.
30 See supra text accompanying notes 318-26.
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First, the case law will be collected and analyzed. Second, the be-
havioral scientific 3' research pertinent to the case law will be col-
lected and analyzed. Finally, the admissibility of the evidence will be
analyzed in light of the behavioral scientific research and the rules of
evidence.
An in-depth analysis of the topic is desirable because of the
confusion that exists among courts regarding the admissibility of
psychological evidence concerning child complainants in sexual
abuse prosecutions. This confusion is manifested in several ways.
To begin with, the holdings of the cases are often flatly contradic-
tory. Further, there is no uniformity in the modes of analysis used
by various courts. Finally, there is a woeful lack of serious review of
the existing behavioral scientific research by the courts. Even the
courts that reach correct results often do so on incorrect or incom-
plete bases. Given the importance of the societal interests at stake
in such cases and the significant possibilities for prejudice to a crimi-
nal defendant if such evidence is improperly admitted, the courts'
confusion should be corrected.
Before this exploration can be undertaken, an important pre-
liminary matter must be dealt with: the term "child sexual abuse"
must be defined. Behavioral scientists have had difficulty both in
developing a suitable definition of their own, and in dealing with
existing legal definitions. 32 They have at times appropriated ex-
isting terms such as "incest," 33 "pedophilia," 34 and "hebephilia," 35
and at other times have coined their own terms such as "accessory-
31 The term "behavioral science" as used herein will refer generally to the study of
human behavior, including studies by psychiatrists, psychologists, nurses, sociologists,
and social workers.
32 Any attempt to define "sexual abuse of children" is fraught with difficulties, for
all definitions are culture- and time-bound. They are not based on rigorous scien-
tific inquiry but on values and beliefs of individuals, professional organizations, and
societies at large. Indeed, the term "child sexual abuse" is not universally accepted
and is frequently interchanged with "sexual exploitation," "sexual misuse" and
"sexual assault." Rather than referring to any specific type of sexual behavior, the
term sexual abuse may mean anything from exhibitionism to genital manipulation
to intercourse to child pornography. Within a legal frame of reference, sexual
abuse is classified by criminal act, such as rape, incest, unlawful sexual intercourse,
buggery, and indecent assault. The incest laws have often failed to take into consid-
eration the changing nature of the family, particularly step-parenthood and adop-
tion. Medically, the definition may become confused with consequences such as
genital injuries, venereal disease, or pregnancy. Clearly, legal and medical
frameworks fail to consider the psychological and interactive aspects of the sexual
experience.
Mrazek, Definition and Recognition of Sexual Child Abuse: Historical and Cultural Perspectives in
SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 5, 11 (P. Mrazek & C. Kempe ed.
1981).
33 "Incest" in the strict, traditional sense "refers to sexual relations between two
family members whose marriage would be proscribed by law or custom." D. FINKELHOR,
supra note 13, at 83. Although much behavioral science literature speaks in terms of
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to- sex victims," 3 6 "sexual misuse"37 and "sexual exploitation."
3 8
One researcher probably summarizes the current feelings of the be-
havioral scientific community when he states: "[C]hild sexual abuse
is not a single entity. It cannot be defined, discussed, or treated as
such."'3 9 Similarly, lawyers and legislators concerned with drafting
criminal statutes that are not ambiguous and that are neither under-
inclusive nor overinclusive have also recognized the difficulties of
defining "sexual abuse."
'40
incest, the term is not particularly helpful for either behavioral scientists or lawyers
when dealing with child sexual abuse.
First, the definition is not limited to adult-child relations. Second, it fails to encom-
pass stepfathers and others not related by blood. This has led some behavioral scientists
to broaden the definition of "incest," such as the following: "overtly sexual contact
between people who are either closely related or perceive themselves to be closely re-
lated (including stepparents, half-siblings, and even live-in lovers if they have assumed a
parental role)." S. FORWARD & C. BUCK, BETRAYAL OF INNOCENCE: INCEST AND ITS DEv-
ASTATION 3-4 (1978). Why behavioral scientists continue to use the term "incest" when
dealing with child sexual abuse is perhaps explained by the following insight by one of
the foremost researchers in the field:
In the past, I have tried to encourage people in the field of sexual abuse to
relinquish the word "incest" and talk about "family or intrafamilial sexual abuse"
(which is what they mean). But this advice has made little headway, especially given
the evocative character of the word "incest," which makes it attractive to everyone
from journalists to graduate students.
D. FINKELHOR, supra note 3, at 224.
34 "Pedophilia" is a sexual deviation of an adult which leads him to direct his sexual
desires toward prepubertal children. Groth, Patterns of Sexual Assault against Children and
Adolescents, in SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 3 (A. Burgess, A. Groth,
L. Holmstrom & S. Sgroi ed. 1978).
35 "Hebephilia" is a sexual deviation of an adult which leads him to direct his sexual
desires toward pubescent children. Id.
36 Defined as persons who are "pressured into sexual activity by a person who stands
in a power position over them as through age, authority, or some other way. The victim
is unable to consent because of either personality or cognitive development." Burgess
& Holmstrom, supra note 19, at 560.
37 Defined as "exposure of a child to sexual stimulation inappropriate for the child's
age, level of psychosexual development, and role in the family." Brant & Tisza, supra
note 17, at 81.
38 This term has not been specifically defined. Instead, the subjects in this study
were asked basically whether what had happened to them seemed abusive. If it did, then
it fell within the category of "sexual exploitation." D. FINKELHOR, supra note 13, at 51-
52.
39 MacFarlane, Jenstrom &Jones, Conclusion: Aspects of Prevention and Protection, in U.S.
DEP'T. HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN: SELECTED READINGS 123
(1980).
40 One commentator has outlined six problems in drafting effective child sexual
abuse legislation:
(1) the range of possible sexual activity.., seems limitless, (2) it is often difficult to
distinguish between appropriate displays of affection and the less damaging forms
of sexual abuse. (3) ... intent of the perpetrator ... can be ... difficult to deter-
mine. (4) there is ... debate concerning the amount of trauma... to children who
have been [abused] . (5) Minors today are much more sexually active than they were
a decade ago .... (6) Sex remains an embarrassing subject for many adults ....
DAVID McCORD
Fortunately, the fact situations in which experts are called to
testify concerning the psychological aspects of "child sexual abuse"
fit rather easily into a functional definition. One author has percep-
tively noted that sexual abuse of children may be classified into
three different types: nontouching, touching, and violent touch-
ing.41 The fact situations of virtually all the cases discussed in this
article fall into the category of touching; that is, the cases do not
include nontouching acts such as obscene phone calls, exhibition-
ism, and voyeurism, nor do they include touching acts coupled with
serious bodily injury or threat of injury, the most typical example of
which is rape. Other common denominators of virtually all of the
cases are that the victim was sixteen years old or younger and fe-
male, while the abuser was substantially older and male.42 Thus, the
functional definition of "child sexual abuse" for purposes of this ar-
Fraser, Sexual Child Abuse: The Legislation and the Law in the United States, in SEXUALLY
ABUSED CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 55, 57 (P. Mrazek & C. Kempe ed. 1981).
For comprehensive reviews of statutory responses to child sexual abuse, see Kocen
& Bulkley, Analysis of Criminal Child Sex Offense Statutes, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE
LAw, 1 (J. Bulkley ed. 1981); Wulkan & Bulkley, Analysis of Incest Statutes, in CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE AND THE LAW 52 (. Bulkley ed. 1981); The Crime of Incest Against the Minor Child and
the States' Statutory Responses, 17J. FAM. L. 93 (1979).
For purposes of this article, it is immaterial which type of statute is the basis for the
criminal charge, since the content of the expert testimony does not vary on the basis of
the statute under which the crime is charged.
41 Non-touching acts include verbal sexual abuse (continual, ongoing discussions,
referrals, or solicitations concerning sexual activity), obscene telephone calls, exhi-
bitionism (a difficult issue if the perpetrator is a member of the child's household),
voyeurism (again, a difficult issue if the perpetrator is a member of the child's
household), and visual or auditory exposure to adults engaged in sexual activity.
The touching acts include fondling (once again, a difficult issue if the perpetra-
tor is a member of the child's household), masturbation, fellatio, cunnilingus, anil-
ingus, anal intercourse, and sexual intercourse.
Violent touching acts include fondling, masturbation, fellatio, cunnilingus, anil-
ingus, anal intercourse, or sexual intercourse coupled with serious bodily injury or
the threat of serious bodily injury (rape).
Fraser, supra note 40, at 58.
The dividing line between child sexual abuse and rape is not a bright one. In fact,
feminists argue that child sexual abuse, whether it involves force or not, is rape. D.
FINKELHOR, supra note 13, at 4. Even though the two concepts can merge, however, a
substantial number of child sexual abuse cases can be distinguished from rape. Some of
the general factors that make child sexual abuse cases distinguishable are: (1) the perpe-
trator is more likely to be known to the victim, (2) there are more often repeated abuses,
often over a long period of time, (3) it involves less physical force, (4) males are more
often victims, (5) the sexual act is usually something less than intercourse, and (6) it
engages a different set of social agencies. D. FINKELHOR, supra note 13, at 2-3.
42 While sexual abuse of boys is a substantial problem, boys are even less likely than
girls to report the abuse. Because of this, and because a substantially larger number of
girls are abused, virtually all behavioral science research focuses on girls. Only four
appellate cases pertinent to the present topic have been found involving boy victims:
People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985); People v. Ortega,
672 P.2d 215 (Colo. App. 1983); State v. Lash, 237 Kan. 384, 699 P.2d 49 (1985); and
State v. Keen, 309 N.C. 158, 305 S.E.2d 535 (1983).
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tide is as follows: sexual touching acts, either by the child of the
adult or the adult of the child, from fondling up to intercourse, with-
out the threat of serious bodily injury, where the complainant is six-
teen years old or less, and usually female while the adult male
participant is substantially older. It is also important to note that
this article will deal almost exclusively with the use of expert psycho-
logical testimony regarding child complainants by the prosecution.
Among the reported cases it is rare to find the defense attempting to
use such testimony.
43
II. THE USE OF AN EXPERT DIAGNOSIS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE TO
PROVE THAT ABUSE OCCURRED.
A. CASE LAW
When a prosecutor offers an expert diagnosis that the com-
plainant has been sexually abused to prove that the crime occurred,
the theory of proof is as follows: a sexually abused child exhibits
certain characteristics not common to children who have not been
sexually abused, these characteristics can be detected by a trained
expert, and thus an expert diagnosis of sexual abuse is evidence that
the crime occurred.
The case law reveals two types of expert diagnoses of child sex-
ual abuse that prosecutors have offered to prove that abuse oc-
curred. The most full-blown type of diagnosis is where the expert
identifies a child sexual abuse "syndrome," then compares the
child's symptoms with the symptoms of that syndrome, and comes
to a diagnosis that the child has been sexually abused. The second
type of testimony is similar, but omits the "syndrome" designation.
The expert simply bases the diagnosis on the comparison of the
complainant's symptoms to those manifested by other child sexual
abuse victims. The expert can explicitly list common symptoms and
then make the comparison. Or the expert's diagnosis can take place
without the expert listing the common symptoms, but instead ex-
plaining his or her own experience in dealing with sexually abused
children. The comparison of symptoms is then implicit rather than
explicit.
That the vast majority of sexual abusers are male is borne out by the case law. No
case has been found pertinent to the present topic where the alleged abuser was female.
43 Only three cases pertinent to the present topic were found where the expert testi-
mony was offered by the defense: State v. Roberts, 139 Ariz. 117, 677 P.2d 280
(1983)(see discussion infra note 319 and accompanying text); State v. Tafoya, 94 N.M.
762, 617 P.2d 151 (1980)(see discussion infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text); and




In the reported cases, experts do not usually couch their diag-
nosis testimony in terms of a child sexual abuse "syndrome." Testi-
mony in that form has been offered only in three cases, two of them
from Minnesota. In the first Minnesota case, State v. Danielski,44 the
prosecution sought to introduce testimony that the complainant was
suffering from "familial sexual abuse syndrome." The substance of
the testimony was that the following symptoms manifested by the
complainant were typical of victims of sexual abuse: depression,
"feeling of having ruined her mother's life," desire not to "cross"
her stepfather (the defendant), and attempted suicide. 45 The trial
court denied the state's pretrial motion in limine to allow such testi-
mony, and the state appealed. The Minnesota Court of Appeals
held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in refusing to
allow the testimony.46 The court relied on an earlier Minnesota case
which had held rape trauma syndrome testimony regarding an adult
complainant inadmissible because it was considered to be of no help
to the jury, unfairly prejudicial, and not generally accepted in the
scientific community as was required by the test first enunciated in
Frye v. United States.47 The Minnesota Court of Appeals in Danielski
was not persuaded that expert familial sexual abuse testimony was
any more scientifically accurate than rape trauma syndrome testi-
mony.48 The rape trauma syndrome case had mentioned a possible
exception to the ban on such testimony in "unusual" cases such as
those in which the complainant was mentally retarded or a minor.49
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, however, held that this exception
did not apply in Danielski because the complainant was now seven-
teen years old and therefore not a child anymore.
50
Six months later, the Minnesota Court of Appeals in State v.
44 350 N.W.2d 395, 396 (Minn. App. 1984).
45 Id. at 398.
46 Id.
47 Id. State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Minn. 1982). The Frye test originated
in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). For a discussion of Fye, see supra
notes 146-58 and accompanying text.
"Rape trauma syndrome" is a term used to describe the typical symptoms of an
adult victim of forcible rape. Although conceptually close to the type of testimony dis-
cussed here, it is quite distinct from a behavioral scientific standpoint because it involves
adult victims, not child victims, and because it involves violent touching, not non-violent
touching acts. For a detailed analysis of rape trauma syndrome evidence in the courts,
see McCord, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony Regarding Rape Trauma Syndrome in Rape
Prosecutions, 26 B.C.L. Rev. 1143 (1985)(hereinafter McCord).
48 Danielski, 350 N.W.2d at 397.
49 Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 231.
50 Danielski, 350 N.W.2d at 398.
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Carlson5l reversed a trial judge for abusing his discretion in summa-
rily rejecting "child sexual abuse syndrome" expert testimony. Dur-
ing that six-month interval, the Minnesota Supreme Court had
decided State v. Myers,52 in which the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that expert testimony diagnosing a child complainant as suffering
from symptoms typical of sexually abused children and diagnosing
the complainant as a victim of child sexual abuse was admissible.
53
Although the testimony in Myers was not couched in terms of a "syn-
drome," the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Carlson obviously, and
probably correctly, viewed Myers as broad enough to sanction even
"syndrome" testimony. Although the holding in Danielski may still
be good law in Minnesota on the narrow ground that the complain-
ant was no longer a child when she testified, the other bases of the
decision are no longer valid after Myers.
The third case involving syndrome testimony contains the most
ringing endorsement of such testimony. 54 In that case, the expert
testified that child sexual abuse victims often experience a five-phase
"child sexual abuse accomodation syndrome" consisting of secrecy,
helplessness, entrapment and accomodation, delayed disclosure,
and retraction. 55 Then, based upon a review of the police reports
and preliminary hearing transcripts of the complainants' testimony,
the expert asserted that the complainants had been sexually
abused. 56 The California Court of Appeals held that the testimony
was properly admitted, reasoning that it would have aided the jury's
understanding in an area where the jury's common knowledge
would perhaps have been an inadequate basis for reaching a deci-
sion. 57 The court rejected the defendant's argument that the syn-
drome did not meet the general acceptance test for scientific
evidence, holding that the test simply did not apply to expert medi-
cal testimony.5
8
51 360 N.W.2d 442, 443 (Minn. App. 1985). The characteristics of the "syndrome"
to which the expert would have testified is not set forth in the opinion.
52 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984). See infra notes 74-83 for a discussion of this case.
53 Id. at 609-11.
54 People v. Payan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 27, 220 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1985).
55 Payan, 173 Cal. App. 3d at -, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 128. The expert's testimony was
based in large part upon Summit, The Child Abuse Accomodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT 177 (1983).
56 Payan, 173 Cal. App. 3d at -, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
57 Id. at-, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 131-33.
58 Id. at-, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 133. One other jurist has indicated that he is convinced
that a "child sexual abuse syndrome" exists. In a concurring opinion in State v. Mid-
dleton, 294 Or. 427, 438, 657 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1983)(Roberts, J. concurring), a case
which did not involve testimony in the "syndrome" form,Justice Roberts of the Oregon
Supreme Court indicated that he was pursuaded by "a significant body of writing...
addressing intrafamily sexual abuse" that such a syndrome exists. Id. at 440, 657 P.2d at
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2. Comparison of symptoms without the use of the term "syndrome"
The second form of expert diagnosis of child sexual abuse is
very similar to "syndrome" testimony, except that it does not attach
the term "syndrome" to the typical characteristics of sexually
abused children to which the complainant is being compared.
Courts have divided virtually equally regarding the admissibility of
such testimony.
The earliest case admitting this type of opinion testimony was
State v. Kim. 59 The state's expert testified that there were common
emotional reactions frequently found in child sexual abuse victims
consisting of "fear of safety, fear of future sexual abuse, feelings of
depression or anxiety, embarrassment ... a negative view of sex,
and doubts that one parent will be strong enough to protect
[against] further sexual abuse." 60 The Hawaii Supreme Court up-
held the admissibility of this testimony against the defendant's ob-
jections that it invaded the province of the jury, was not a proper
subject matter for expert testimony, and its probative value was out-
weighed by its prejudicial effect.6 1 The court found the critical in-
quiry to be whether the evidence would assist the trier of fact.62 The
court noted that in order to assist the jury an expert "must base his
testimony upon a sound factual foundation; any inferences or opin-
ions must be the product of an explicable and reliable system of
analysis; and such opinions must add to the common understanding
of the jury."' 63 Further, even if the evidence will assist the jury, the
judge must determine that its probative value is not substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.64 The court then held that the
trial judge had not abused his discretion in finding that the evidence
1222. He identified some of the elements of the syndrome as the child becoming anx-
ious, guilt-ridden, confused in their feelings for the abuser, and typically responding by
"running away or recanting their story." Id. For a case where the prosecution claimed
that syndrome testimony is "the wave of the future," but the court found that it did not
need to reach the issue, see State v. Snapp, 110 Idaho 269,-, 715 P.2d 939, 942 (1986).
59 64 Haw. 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982).
60 Kim, 64 Haw. at 601, 645 P.2d at 1333. This testimony was given in the course of
the expert's explanation of why he found the complainant's testimony credible. This
demonstrates that it is not always easy to find a clearcut dividing line between evidence
offered to prove that the crime occurred, and evidence offered to vouch for the com-
plainant's credibility. This is so because these two issues in a sexual abuse case usually
almost exactly coincide. For a further discussion of this issue, see infra, text accompany-
ing note 225.
61 Kim, 64 Haw. at 602-10, 645 P.2d at 1334-39.
62 Id. at 604-05, 645 P.2d at 1336 (citing HAW. R. EvID. 702)(identical to FED. R.
EvID. 702).
63 Kim, 64 Haw. at 604, 645 P.2d at 1336.
64 Id. at 607, 645 P.2d at 1337. This balancing is mandated by HAW. R. EvID. 403,
which is identical to FED. R. EVID. 403.
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would assist the jury and that its probative value was not substan-
tially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.65 The court specifically
noted that the common experience of the jury "may represent a less
than adequate foundation for assessing the credibility" of a child
sexual complainant. 66 The court found the expert's experience with
child sexual abuse victims, in conjunction with his education and
training, a sufficient basis for the reliability of his testimony.
67
The testimony in the next two cases allowing expert evidence
concerning the typical behavior of victims of child sexual abuse was
much less explicit. In State v. Middleton68 the state's expert testified
that when she interviewed the complainant she "found her behavior
very much in keeping with children who have complained of sex mo-
lestation at home." 69 The Oregon Supreme Court upheld the ad-
missibility of this testimony over the defendant's objections that it
invaded the province of the jury and was improper opinion testi-
mony.70 In the other nonexplicit case where such testimony was ad-
mitted,71 all that appears in the appellate opinion concerning the
expert's testimony was that the complainant's "unusual behavior"
around the time of the alleged abuse was consistent with, and could
be indicative of, sexual assault.72 The court reasoned that since
parents have long been allowed to testify concerning a child's physi-
cal appearance after sexual abuse, there is no reason to preclude
either a parent or an expert from testifying about behavioral
changes. 73
In State v. Myers,74 an important case in which the diagnosis of
child abuse was admitted, the testimony was quite explicit. The ex-
pert testified that the following constituted characteristics usually
65 Kim, 64 Haw. at 607, 645 P.2d at 1338-39.
66 Id. at 607, 645 P.2d at 1337.
67 Id. at 608, 645 P.2d at 1338.
68 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983).
69 Id. at 432, 657 P.2d at 1218. This case also involved expert testimony that falls
into the third category, testimony offered to enhance the complainant's credibility with-
out vouching for it. For a discussion of this aspect of the case, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 301-03.
70 Middleton, 294 Or. at 435-38, 657 P.2d at 1219-21. The court's reasoning-that
the opinion was proper to explain the complainant's superficially bizarre behavior-re-
ally applies to the testimony by the other expert in that case, whose testimony fell into
the different category of testimony offered to enhance the complainant's credibility with-
out vouching for it. The court did not set forth any reasoning with respect to the first
expert's testimony that appears to fall into the category of offered to prove that the
crime occurred.
71 State v. Claflin, 38 Wash. App. 847, 690 P.2d 1186 (1984).
72 Id. at 854, 690 P.2d at 1191.
73 Id.
74 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984).
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found in sexually abused children: fear of blame or punishment,
fear of possible breakup of the family, fear that she won't be be-
lieved, confusion because the child feels that the acts are "not right"
while the adult perpetrator tells the child the contrary, and a poor
relationship between mother and daughter.75 The expert stated
that more specific characteristics include "fear of men, nightmares
... [with] an assaultive content, [and] sexual knowledge unusual in a
child.., of [that] age."' 76 The child may also look and act older than
she is. 77 On the basis of these symptoms the expert diagnosed the
complainant as a sexually abused child.78 The Minnesota Supreme
Court analyzed the admissibility of this testimony on the basis of
whether it assisted the jury in resolving the factual question
presented 79 and whether its probative value was substantially out-
weighed by its prejudicial effect.80 The court found that the evi-
dence was properly admitted, primarily because jurors are
particularly uninformed regarding the reaction of children to sexual
abuse and thus "by explaining the emotional antecedents of the vic-
tim's conduct and the peculiar impact of the crime on other mem-
bers of the family, an expert can assist the jury in evaluating the
credibility of the complainant."81 The court also rejected the de-
fendant's contention that the testimony was unreliable because the
conditions described by the expert were "highly subjective and not
necessarily the result of sexual molestation. '" 8 2 The court held that
this objection went to the weight of the testimony, not to its
admissibility.
8 3
Thus, four courts have held that a diagnosis of a complainant as
a victim of child sexual abuse on the basis of a comparison with
other children who have been sexually abused is admissible.
8 4
75 Id. at 609.
76 Id. at 608-09.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 609. The expert also gave testimony that falls into the second category, i.e.
expert testimony vouching for the complainant's credibility. For a discussion of this
aspect of the testimony, see infra note 217.
79 Myers, 359 N.W.2d at 609 (citing MINN. R. EvID. 702)(identical to FED. R. EvID.
702).
80 Myers, 359 N.W.2d at 609 (citing MINN. R. EvID. 403)(identical to FED. R. EvID.
403).
81 Id. at 610.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 611.
84 See State v. Snapp, 110 Idaho 269, 715 P.2d 939 (1986) (such diagnosis made at
trial with no objection by defendant). Worthy of note is the case of I re Cheryl H., 153
Cal. App. 3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1984). The case is not discussed in this article
because it was a non-criminal, child custody matter. The case does, however, contain a
rather ringing endorsement of this type of testimony. See id. at 1116-18, 200 Cal. Rptr.
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On the other hand, five courts either held such testimony to be
inadmissible, or indicated strong doubts concerning its admissibil-
ity. In the earliest case on this subject,85 a gynecologist who ex-
amined the complainant the day that she reported the abuse
testified that in his opinion, based on the history given to him by the
complainant, she had been abused.86 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court held that the testimony was improperly admitted because
such a diagnosis was not within the doctor's expertise, and because
it constituted an improper bolstering of the complainant's
credibility.8
7
Two years later in State v. Maule,8 8 the expert testified that the
typical characteristics of sexually abused children included sleep and
appetite disruption, nightmares, withdrawl or regressive behavior,
clinging to the mother, and fear of being alone with a particular per-
son.8 9 Although the Washington Court of Appeals reversed the
case on another ground,90 the court felt compelled to express its
doubts concerning the admissibility of the expert's testimony. The
court noted that under Washington law expert testimony must assist
the trier of fact 9 ' and must be based upon facts of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the field. 92 The court then expressed its
doubt that this testimony would be admissible under these rules. It
stated that the expert's theory that sexually abused children mani-
fest particular identifiable characteristics was not shown to be sup-
ported by accepted medical or scientific opinion.93 Further, there
was no evidence that experts reasonably relied upon the factors set
forth by this expert in coming to diagnoses of child sexual abuse.
Also, there was no evidence of any statistical study that had been
conducted in the field, nor was there an indication that the charac-
teristics are considered adequate indicia of child abuse.94 Addition-
799-801. The fact that different standards regarding the admissibility of expert testi-
mony apply in criminal and non-criminal matters is, however, highlighted by a subse-
quent California Court of Appeals criminal case involving similar testimony that was
held to be inadmissible, distinguishing In re Cheryl H. as a non-criminal case. People v.
Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45, 50 n.4 (1985).
85 State v. Castore, 435 A.2d 321 (R.I. 1981).
86 Id. at 325.
87 Id. at 326.
88 State v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287, 667 P.2d 96 (1983).
89 Id. at 289-90, 667 P.2d at 97 n.1.
90 For a discussion of the grounds of reversal, see infra, note 104.
91 Maule, 35 Wash. App. at 292, 667 P.2d at 99 (citing WASH. R. EvID. 702)(identical
to FED. R. EVID. 702).
92 Maule, 35 Wash. App. at 294-95, 667 P.2d at 100 (citing WASH. R. EVID. 703)(iden-
tical to FED. R. EvID. 703).
93 Maule, 35 Wash. App. at 294-95, 667 P.2d 96, 100.
94 Id.
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ally, there was no showing that the underlying data base could be
verified, that is, no showing that the other children to whom the
expert was comparing the complainant actually had been sexually
abused. 95 And finally, there was no evidence that any statistical
study had been done showing a correspondence between the char-
acteristics and sexual abuse as their cause. 96
The next three cases holding expert diagnosis of sexual abuse
inadmissible sounded a common theme in their holdings: that such
testimony was, in effect, an impermissible opinion that the com-
plainant was telling the truth. In State v. Haseltine,97 the state
presented a psychiatrist's testimony concerning the pattern of be-
havior exhibited by incest victims, and the psychiatrist went on to
give his opinion that there was "no doubt whatsoever" that the com-
plainant was an incest victim. 98 Without commenting on whether
the portion of the testimony setting forth the pattern of behavior of
incest victims was proper, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that
the psychiatrist's expression of his opinion that the complainant was
an incest victim was impermissible since no witness may testify "that
another mentally and physically competent witness is telling the
truth."99
The Washington Court of Appeals came to a similar conclusion
in State v. Fitzgerald.100 There a pediatrician testified that based on
her interviews with the two complainants, "she believed that they
had been molested." 10 1 The court held that this testimony was im-
properly admitted because an expert may not go so far as to usurp
the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and deter-
mine credibility. 10 2
The most recent in the line of cases equating the expert's opin-
ion that the child has been abused with an opinion that the child is
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 120 Wis. 2d 92, 352 N.W.2d 673 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
98 Id. at 95-96, 352 N.W.2d at 675-76.
99 Id. at 96, 352 N.W.2d at 676. This holding highlights the fact that the first cate-
gory of testimony-that offered to prove that abuse occurred-is closely related to the
second category-an expert's vouching for the complainant's credibility. This is neces-
sarily true because usually the credibility of the complainant is the key issue in such a
case. It will be demonstrated that the results of the admissibility analysis with respect to
the two categories of testimony yields identical results. See infra, text accompanying
notes 192-214, 231-64, and 273-95. For purposes of analysis, however, it is helpful to
keep the two categories of evidence separate.
100 39 Wash. App. 652, 694 P.2d 1117 (1985).
10 1 Id. at 656, 694 P.2d at 1121.
102 Id. at 657, 694 P.2d at 1121 (quoting 5A K. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE,
Evidence, § 292 n.4 at 39 (2d ed. 1982), United States v. Samara, 643 F.2d 701, 705 (10th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 829 (1981)).
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telling the truth is People v. Roscoe.10 3 The California Court of Ap-
peals held that such a diagnosis was improperly admitted, stating:
Where the expert refers to specific events, people, and personalities
and bases his opinion as to credibility on his diagnosis of this witness,
then the conclusion that the witness is credible rests upon the premise
that the diagnosis is accurate, and that in fact molestation had oc-
curred. The jury in effect is being asked to believe the diagnosis, to
agree that the doctor's analysis is correct and that the defendant is
guilty. 10 4
Thus, courts that have ruled on the issue of the admissibility of
non-syndrome diagnoses of child sexual abuse are virtually evenly
divided between the view that such evidence is admissible and the
view that it is inadmissible. 10 5
103 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985).
104 Id. at 1099-1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 50. The court would allow the expert in rebut-
tal to give testimony falling into the third category-enhancing the complainant's credi-
bility without vouching for it. For discussion of this aspect of the case, see infra text
accompanying notes 302.
105 Five cases in which a diagnosis was offered, but where its admissibility was not
expressly ruled upon, deserve mention. In People v. Ortega, 672 P.2d 215 (Colo. App.
1983), the expert gave a diagnosis along with testimony relating directly to the com-
plainant's credibility. Id. at 218. The court, without discussing the diagnosis, held that
the admission of the credibility testimony was error (albeit harmless) because the credi-
bility of the child had not been attacked at the stage of the proceedings when the testi-
mony was offered. Id. at 218.
In State v. Keen, 309 N.C. 158, 305 S.E.2d 535 (1983), the expert testified that the
complainant was suffering from the typical symptoms of "anxiety, anger, shame, guilt,
and feelings of worthlessness." Id. at 161, 305 S.E.2d at 537. The expert went on to
state that he believed that the attack as testified to by the complainant "was a reality."
Id. at 162, 305 S.E.2d at 537. Without discussing the admissibility of the typical symp-
tom testimony, the court held that the admission of the expert's opinion that the attack
"was a reality" was reversible error because it constituted an opinion concerning the
defendant's guilt. Id. at 163, 305 S.E.2d at 538.
In State v. Raye, 73 N.C. App. 273, 326 S.E.2d 333, review denied, 313 N.C. 609, 332
S.E.2d 183 (1985), diagnosis testimony was offered, along with an opinion that children
do not generally fantasize sexual abuse. Id. at -, 326 S.E.2d at 335. Without examining
the diagnosis testimony, the court approved the use of the testimony regarding fantasy.
Id. at -, 326 S.E.2d at 335-36. For a further discussion of the fantasy aspect of the
testimony, see infra text accompanying note 268.
In State v. Lash, 237 Kan. 384, 699 P.2d 49 (1985), the trial court admitted diagno-
sis testimony, but refused to allow the expert to testify that he believed that the defend-
ant was the perpetrator. Id. at 384-85, 699 P.2d at 50. The defendant was acquitted and
the state appealed the exclusion of this evidence. Without discussing whether the diag-
nosis was properly admitted, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of the
opinion concerning the identity of the perpetrator because an expert is not allowed to
pass judgment upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight of disputed evidence. Id.
at 386, 699 P.2d at 51.
Finally, in Hall v. State, 15 Ark. App. 309, 692 S.W.2d 769 (1985), the expert testi-
fied that typical symptoms include "bedwetting, loss of appetite, refusal to go to
school," clinging to a parent, being reluctant to go out of the house or yard, and devel-
oping a tic. Id. at 312, 692 S.W.2d at 770. Without discussing the admissibility of this
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B. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
It is only in the last ten years that behavioral scientists have be-
gun to intensively study the problem of child sexual abuse. 10 6 From
the beginning of that period, 10 7 at its midpoint, 08 and through the
present, 0 9 researchers have lamented the dearth of solid empirical
research regarding child sexual abuse. In 1980 a researcher review-
ing the literature on the subject, came to the conclusion that little
had been learned about child sexual abuse during the preceding
twenty-five years.' 10 He also noted that the literature dealing with
the sexual abuse of minors, was "scant, unintegrated, and ambigu-
ous. Books on the topic are rare. Articles are scattered and hidden
among a wide range ofjournals, many in nonaccessible medical and
legal journals.""'
One reason for the lack of solid research is simply that the sub-
ject is a very difficult one to study. Only a small percentage of cases
is ever reported. 1 2 In those cases that are reported, the partici-
pants are often reluctant to discuss the situation. As a result of
problems like these there are methodological difficulties virtually
built into most research projects in the area. 113 Thus, even critics of
testimony, the court reversed because the expert went on to opine about typical charac-
teristics of offenders. Id. at 316, 692 S.W.2d at 773.
The offering of an expert opinion by the prosecution concerning the typical charac-
teristics of offenders warrants further discussion because it has occurred in several cases
in addition to Hall. In every case where such testimony has been admitted by the trial
court, the appellate court has held it to be error because the evidence is in effect imper-
missible character evidence which tends to lead the jury to convict on the basis of
probability. These holdings are clearly correct under FED. R. EvID. 404(a). See State v.
Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287, 293, 667 P.2d 96, 99 (1983) (testimony that majority of
sexual abuse cases involve a male parent figure with biological parents in the majority
was reversible error where defendant was a father-figure of complainants); State v. Pe-
trich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 576, 683 P.2d 173, 180 (1984)(testimony that in eighty-five to
ninety percent of child abuse cases abuser is known to victim, where defendant was com-
plainant's grandfather, should not have been admitted); State v. Claflin, 38 Wash. App.
847, 852, 690 P.2d 1186, 1190 (1984) (testimony that forty-three percent of child moles-
tation cases involved father-figures as perpetrators, where defendant was a father-figure,
was inadmissible).
106 D. FINKELHOR, supra note 3.
107 See, e.g., the 1975 observation that there were a "limited number of research arti-
cles on the subject of the psychological components of the reactions of child victims to
sexual offenses." Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 19, at 562, 80-81.
108 See, e.g., the 1980 observation that child sexual abuse is a "relatively unexplored
area for researchers and many front-line providers." U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERV-
ICES, SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN: SELECTED READINGS 1 (1980).
109 D. FINKELHOR, supra note 3, at vii-viii.
110 THE SEXUAL VICTIMOLOGY OF YOUTH (L. Schultz ed. 1980) at vii.
111 Id. at viii.
112 See supra note 16.
113 See infra, text accompanying notes 130-31.
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the studies that have been conducted emphasize "that this is not an
easy area to study by any method.""t 4
Difficulties notwithstanding, there have been many serious at-
tempts to discover what short-term psychological consequences
children often suffer as a result from sexual abuse. The virtually
uniform conclusion of these studies is that the short-term psycho-
logical consequences vary dramatically. The literature is rife with
the observation that the reactions observed in children vary widely
from study to study."15 As one recent review of the literature on
the subject noted, "In viewing literature on the consequences to the
child of child-adult sexual interactions, one is impressed by the tre-
mendous variability recorded by various authors." 116
Because of the variability of responses, researchers have been
frank to admit that they simply cannot tell what the reactions to sex-
ual abuse of any particular child will be. On this important point it
is probably best to let the researchers speak for themselves. These
114 Tsai, Feldman-Summers & Edgar, supra note 24. Indicative of the difficulty of re-
search in this area is the fact that most empirical studies tend to be based on two meth-
ods, neither of which is ideal for studying the immediate impact of sexual abuse upon a
child. One method is "retrospective" surveys, that is, surveys of the adult population
asking them to report sexual abuse that was inflicted upon them years earlier. Several
commentators have noted the predominance of retrospective studies. See, e.g., Brant &
Tisza, supra note 17, at 80; Summit & Kryso, SexualAbuse of Children: A Clinical Spectrum,
48 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 237 (1978), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERV-
ICES, SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN: SELECTED READINGS 51, 57 (1980). As of 1980, one
researcher who surveyed the literature found that eighteen of the twenty-eight major
studies that had been conducted were retrospective. Constantine, The Effects of Early
Sexual Experiences: A Review and Synthesis of Research, in CHILDREN AND SEX 217, 218 (L.
Constantine & F. Martinson ed. 1981). The second type of study that has tended to be
conducted can be described as "anecdotal." These studies describe a very small number
of cases in minute detail. THE SEXUAL VICTIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 25 (L. Schultz ed. 1980).
See, e.g., Boekelheide, Sexual Adjustment of College Women Who Experience Incestuous Relation-
ships, 26 J. OF THE AM. COLLEGE HEALTH ASS'N 327 (1978)(based on six cases); Cormier
& Boulanger, Life Cycle and Episodic Recidivism, 18 CANADIAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N J. 283
(1973)(studying two families); and Dixon, Arnold, & Calestro, Father-Son Incest: Unre-
ported Psychiatric Problems, 135 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 835 (1978)(based on six cases). In
addition to these problematic types of studies, some of the predominant subject inter-
ests of the behavioral scientific researchers have not been particularly illuminating con-
cerning children's reactions to sexual abuse. It has been noted that one major
preoccupation of the research has been with family structure and dynamics, that is, what
it is in a family that causes sexual abuse to occur. Constantine, supra at 236. Part and
parcel of this inquiry is another major focus of the research, the typical characteristics of
offenders. N. GAGER & C. SCHURR, SEXUAL ASSAULT: CONFRONTING RAPE IN AMERICA 35
(1976).
115 B.JUSTICE & R.JUSTICE, THE BROKEN TABOO: SEX IN THE FAMILY 167 (1979); Con-
stantine, supra note 113, at 222; LaBarbera & Dozier, Psychological Responses of Incestuous
Daughters: Emerging Patterns, 74 S. MEDICAL J. 1478, 1478-79 (1981); Tsai, Feldman-
Summers & Edgar, supra note 24, at 201.
116 Abel, Becker, & Cunningham-Rathner, Complications, Consent, and Cognitions in Sex
Between Children and Adults, 7 INTERNATIONALJ. OF LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 89, 93 (1984).
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observations, which are arranged in chronological order of their
publication, indicate that from the beginning of research on the
topic in the mid 1970's until the present time, researchers have
never been able to pin down typical psychological symptoms of sex-
ually abused children. "The specific emotional consequences of
sexual abuse cannot presently be predicted. .... ,,117 "Children can
exhibit the entire gamut of behaviors in response to a sexual assault,
ranging from the negative to the positive." 118 "[T]he actual re-
sponse to a trauma, such as sexual seduction, varies considerably
from 1 child to another." 1 9 "Children's immediate reactions to an
assault vary."' 20 "The literature on diagnosis does not indicate that
professionals agree on any of the effects of sexual abuse on mi-
nors."'12 1 "Incest victims show a wide variety of symptom com-
plaints or may show none at all."' 22  Since there are no typical
symptoms, diagnosis is very difficult. As one behavioral scientist
noted, "even those professionals who have a clinical definition with
which they are comfortable will still have problems in identifying
sexually abused children."'
23
The reason that such a wide variety of symptoms has been
noted is that child sexual abuse is a very complex psychological phe-
nomenon from the point of view of the victim. This can perhaps
best be illustrated by comparing it with adult rape, which is, by con-
trast, a very unambiguous psychological phenomenon from the vic-
tim's perspective. In a rape the victim is coerced by physical force
or threats of physical force to engage in sexual activity which she
does not desire. Under these circumstances, there is no possibility
of the victim enjoying the activity or emerging from the situation
with any positive psychological emotions. Accordingly, it is not sur-
prising that the reactions of adult victims to forcible rape are re-
markably similar to each other and are drastically negative. 24 By
contrast, a child sexual abuse victim's feelings may be, and often
117 Berliner & Stevens, supra note 18, at 48.
118 Sgroi, supra note 20, at 135.
119 Rosenfeld, Nadelson & Krieger, Fantasy and Reality in Patients' Reports of Incest, 40 J.
OF CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 162 (1979).
120 U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN: SELECTED
READINGS 5 (1980).
121 Schultz, Diagnosis and Treatment-Introduction, in THE SEXUAL VICTIMOLOGY OF
YOUTH 39 (L. Schultz ed. 1980).
122 1. STUART & J. GREER, supra note 24, at 59. See also Sgroi, Sexual Mfolestation of
Children: The Last Frontier in Child Abuse, CHILDREN TODAY May-June 1975 18, reprinted in
THE SEXUAL VICTIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 25 (L. Schultz ed. 1980); and Tsai, Feldman-Sum-
mers & Edgar, supra note 24, at 202.
123 Mrazek, supra note 32, at 14.
124 See McCord, supra note 47.
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are, ambivalent. The victim's will is usually much more malleable
than an adult's, particularly when the perpetrator may be assuring
the child that the activity is proper. The child may affirmatively de-
sire attention from the perpetrator even if the attention is not of the
type condoned by society. The coercion involved is usually less
than physical force or threats of physical force. In these ambivalent
circumstances, the child may even feel physical pleasure during the
activity. As one researcher cogently put it:
Contrary to the stereotype, most victims in our study readily acknowl-
edged the positive as well as the negative elements of their experience.
They talked about the times the physical sensations felt good, or they
remembered how their sexual experience with an adult or family mem-
ber satisfied a longing for affection and closeness that was rarely met
at any other time.125
While it is probably a correct perception that whatever positive
feelings exist are part of a confusing flood of feelings and sensations
with which the child's mind is not able to cope, and that the positive
feelings are "usually dwarfed by an overwhelming sense of helpless-
ness, guilt, anger, or fear,"' 126 the existence of this ambivalence has
prevented researchers from making a successful generalization re-
garding the immediate psychological consequences of child sexual
abuse.
Realizing that children's reactions vary dramatically, research-
ers have attempted to compile lists of variables that may affect a
child's reaction. A typical list is as follows: relationship between the
perpetrator and the victim, the number of incidents, the length of
time over which the incidents occurred, the degree of force used,
the degree of gratification to the child, the age and developmental
level of the child, and the reaction of parents and others to the reve-
125 D. FINKELHOR, supra note 13, at 65. While this researcher found that sixty-six per-
cent of adult females who had been sexually abused as children remembered the experi-
ence as primarily negative, only seven percent remembered it as primarily positive. Id.
Another researcher found the rememberances of the victims of the abuse to be fifty-five
percent positive and only thirty-nine percent negative. Nelson, supra note 24, at 166. In
another study, the four most common adjectives mentioned by victims were all positive
with the first negative adjective, fear, being found in fifth place. Constantine, supra note
114, at 225-26.
None of this is meant to indicate the author's belief that there are any positive values
to sexual activity between adults and children. Indeed, there is every indication that the
long-term effects of child sexual abuse on the victim are usually devastating. For exam-
ple, there is general agreement that victims of child sexual abuse often have grave diffi-
culties with sex when they reach adulthood. LaBarbera & Dozier, supra note 115, at
1479. This notwithstanding, most studies have found some percentage of sexually
abused children who suffer no negative consequences. Constantine, supra note 114, at
223-24.
126 D. FINKELHOR, supra note 13, at 65-66.
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lation of the abuse.127 Yet despite the intuitions of researchers that
all of these variables are significant, the one study which has at-
tempted to assess the impact of such variables found that only two
were statistically significant: the amount of force employed, and the
age of the perpetrator.
1 28
In summary, the words of one researcher express both the frus-
tration felt by the scientific community because of its inability to get
a handle on this ambivalent phenomenon and that community's
continuing surprise that such a repugnant action as sexually abusing
a child may result in little or no negative impact on the victim:
We seem to flounder when elements such as ingratiation, promise, or
entreaty, rather than physical force, are used to gain compliance from
the minor, or when some child victims report enjoying and prolonging
the sexual relationship with adults....
We simply do not have any criteria to determine how each minor
will react to the sexual event, but it seems clear that some victim's
personality may be plastic and highly adaptive, without indication of
trauma.... While data are scanty, the conception of all child victims
being sacrificed to adult lust would seem unfounded. Sexual behavior
between adult and child or between two minors is neither harmful nor
harmless always.' 29
As if it were not problem enough that researchers cannot find
typical symptoms of sexually abused children, and cannot even be
sure which variables affect reactions, many researchers note that the
studies that have been done are almost always riddled with severe
methodological difficulties. The most thorough critique of the
methodologies employed suggests several difficulties: much "re-
search" is really a compilation of diverse cases; samples tested are
not representative; case reports on which much of the research is
based do not permit the establishment of general principles; few
studies have utilized any standardized outcome measures of cogni-
tive or psychological functioning, but rather they have relied upon
unstandardized psychiatric interviews; the criteria which researchers
have used to assess psychological effects have often lacked specific-
ity and accuracy; there has been insufficient consideration given to
the question of whether associations between early sexual abuse and
later consequences are causally related; and most studies have not
utilized control groups. 30 Thus, one researcher has stated:
127 Sgroi, supra note 20, at 134-35. See also, D. FINKELHOR, supra note 13, at 106; THE
SEXUAL VICTIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 21 (L. Schultz ed. 1980); U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVICES, SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN: SELECTED READINGS 5 (1980); Abel, Becker, &
Cunningham-Rathner, supra note 116, at 90-93; Schultz, supra note 121.
128 D. FINKELHOR, supra note 13, at 107.
129 Schultz, supra note 121, at 39-40.
130 p. Mrazek & D. Mrazek, The Effects of Child Sexual Abuse: Methodological Considerations,
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The methods employed differ in numerous ways, as do the samples
studied, thereby making it virtually impossible to disentangle effects
due to the research methods from effects due, for example, to differ-
ences among molested children in terms of age and gender of the
child and the molester, the acts engaged in and so forth. In short, our
knowledge about psychological impacts of sexual molestation is
limited. 13'
Notwithstanding the general recognition that there are no typi-
cal symptoms of sexually abused children, and the methodological
problems with the studies that have been done, some researchers
have attempted to put together lists of symptoms. The common
characteristic of such lists is that they are very general symptoms
which occur to some extent in most children, and may be caused by
many factors other than sexual abuse. A typical list is as follows: for
children under five-developmental regression, clinging to mother,
recurring night terrors; for school-age children-gain or loss of
weight, drop in academic performance, insomnia, depression, anxi-
ety, fears, conversion hysteria and running away; for older adoles-
cents-social isolation delinquent behavior, depression, separation
from important males, suicide, and aggressive behavior towards the
mother.' 3 2 The lack of the establishment of any causal relationship
between these symptoms and child sexual abuse has been noted.
"There is very little descriptive material in our literature on how to
separate the manifestations of sexual abuse from nonsexual etiolo-
gies [causes] of the same problems in children and adolescents."' 133
Accordingly, these lists of symptoms must be viewed not as precise,
empirically-derived criteria, but as the best general guidance that
persons experienced in the area can give to those who are trying to
detect sexually abused children.
in SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 235, 238 (P. Mrazek & C. Kempe ed.
1981). See also, LaBarbera & Dozier, supra note 115, at 1479; Schultz, supra note 121, at
192-93; and Constantine, supra note 114, at 222. A particular methodological difficulty
that is often mentioned is that the reported cases, on which much of the research is
based, may be significantly different than the cases that are never reported. See D.
FINKELHOR, supra note 13, at 34; Abel, Becker, & Cunningham-Rathner, supra note 116,
at 90-93; Rosenfeld, Nadelson, Krieger & Backman, Incest and SexualAbuse of Children, 16
J. OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF CHILD PSYCHIATRY 338 (1977).
131 Tsai, Feldman-Summers & Edgar, supra note 24, at 202.
132 Woodling & Kossoris, Sexual Misuse: Rape, Molestation and Incest, 28 PEDIATRIC CLIN-
ICS OF N. AM. 489 (1981). See also S. FORWARD & C. BUCK, supra note 33, at 22-23; B.
JUSTICE & R.JUSTICE, supra note 115, at 155-58; THE SEXUAL VICTIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 22
(L. Schultz ed. 1980); Berliner, Canfield-Blick & Bulkley, Expert Testimony on the Dynamics
of Intra-Family Child Sexual Abuse and Principles of Child Development, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
AND THE LAW 161, 172 (J. Bulkley ed. 1981); Brant & Tisza, supra note 17, at 83; Burgess
& Hohmstrom, supra note 19, at 551, 75; and Nadelson & Rosenfeld, Sexual Misuse of
Children, in CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 89, 94 (D. Schetky & E. Benedek ed. 1980).
133 Nadelson & Rosenfeld, supra note 132, at 94-95.
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In summary, behavioral scientific research does not support the
existence of a sexually abused child "syndrome." Neither does it
support the proposition that there are typical symptoms of sexually
abused children, or even that certain symptoms predominate among
sexually abused children. Finally, the research does not support the
conclusion that an expert in the field of child sexual abuse has any
accurate way to diagnose a particular child as a victim of sexual
abuse.
C. ADMISSIBILITY ANALYSIS
1. General Analytical Framework
Before beginning an analysis of admissibility, a general analyti-
cal framework to be used throughout the remainder of this article
regarding admissibility of expert testimony will be set forth. The
framework will be constructed under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
It is highly desirable that such an analytical framework be devel-
oped, because a consistent, helpful analytical framework can not be
drawn from the case law. There appear to be three problems con-
tributing to the unsatisfactory state of the case law.
First, the objections typically raised to expert testimony regard-
ing a child complainant are imprecise, overlapping, and not explic-
itly sanctioned by the Rules. Perhaps the most common objection is
that the testimony "invades the province of thejury."1 34 This objec-
tion is not keyed to any particular Federal Rule of Evidence, and a
reading of the cases shows that it can refer to three different conten-
tions; first, that the testimony will not assist the jury because it does
not relate to a subject that is "beyond the ken" of the jury;1 3 5 sec-
ond, that the determination of the credibility of a witness is pecu-
liarly within the province of the jury and that expert testimony
concerning witness credibility is thus an "improper bolstering";
t1 6
and third, that the testimony is unfairly prejudicial because it over-
whelms the jury with an aura of scientific reliability.t3 7 Another ob-
134 See, e.g. State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 548, 602-607, 645 P.2d 1330, 1334-39 (1982); State
v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 435, 657 P.2d 1215, 1219-21 (1983). It will also be assumed
throughout this article that the trier of fact is a jury, not a judge. This assumption com-
ports with the reality of virtually every reported case in this area.
135 See also, Kim, 64 Haw. at 602-07, 645 P.2d at 1334-39.
136 See, e.g., People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093,-, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45, 50 (1985);
State v. Fitzgerald, 39 Wash. App. 652, 694 P.2d 1117, 1121 (1985); State v. Haseltine,
120 Wis. 2d 92, -, 352 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
137 So far this contention has not been made explicit with respect to expert testimony
regarding sexually abused children. It has, however, often been made explicit with re-
spect to the closely related topic of expert testimony regarding adult rape complainants.
See, e.g., State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229-30 (Minn. 1982); State v. Taylor, 663
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jection that is sometimes made-that the topic is not a proper
subject for expert opinion' 3 8-can mean either of two things that
overlap with the "invades the province of the jury" objection: that
the subject matter is not beyond the ken of the jury, and that the
testimony constitutes an improper bolstering of the credibility of a
witness. Another common objection is that the testimony is not suf-
ficiently reliable to assist the jury. 39 This objection sometimes en-
tails a discussion of the extent to which the ability of the expert to
make the diagnosis is accepted by the pertinent scientific commu-
nity. 140 As will be shown below, such an objection, which raises the
spectre of the Frye rule, is problematic because the status of the Frye
rule is itself problematic. 14
1
The second factor contributing to the unsatisfactory state of the
case law is that courts do not always begin their analyses at the obvi-
ous starting point: whether the testimony "will assist" the trier of
fact. 142 Courts are often beguiled by easily-cited case law stating the
principle that ordinarily a jury does not need expert assistance in
determining the credibility of witnesses, without ever examining
whether the expert testimony assisted the jury in the case before
it. 143
The third major factor contributing to the unsatisfactory state
of the case law is that even the courts which do recognize the obvi-
ous beginning point144 diverge dramatically in analyzing whether
S.W.2d 235, 240 (Mo. 1984). Undoubtedly, this concern that the expert may overwhelm
the jury a part in court decisions regarding expert testimony about sexually abused chil-
dren, even if the concern is not made explicit.
138 See, e.g., State v. Danielski, 350 N.W.2d 395, 397 (Minn. App. 1984); State v.
Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287, 294, 667 P.2d 96, 100 (1983).
139 See, e.g., Maule, 35 Wash. App. at 295, 667 P.2d at 100.
Whether cited or not, the inquiry concerning the extent of acceptance by the perti-
nent scientific community is derived from the famous case of Frye, 293 F. 1013, which
held that for novel scientific evidence to be admissible, the technique from which the
evidence was derived must be generally accepted by the scientific community from which
it arose. Id. at 1014. For more about the Frye rule, see infra text accompanying notes
146-70.
140 See, e.g., State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 548, 604, 645 P.2d 1130, 1136 (1982).
141 See infra, text accompanying notes 146-70.
142 FED. R. EVID. 702.
143 State v. Fitzgerald, 69 Wash. App. 652, 657, 694 P.2d 1117, 1121 (1985).
144 Some courts view FED. R. EVID. 701 as the second step of a three-step analysis, the
first step of which is whether the evidence is relevant under FED. R. EVID. 401, and the
third step of which is whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially out-
weighed by countervailing considerations under FED. R. EVID. 403. See, e.g., State v.
Brown, 797 Or. 404, 409, 687 P.2d 751, 754-55 (1984). This three-step process is cer-
tainly correct under the Federal Rules, but a FED. R. EvID. 701 analysis concerning
whether the evidence will assist the trier of fact also involves considerations of relevance
(if the evidence is not relevant, it will not assist the trier of fact) and countervailing
dangers (if the countervailing dangers substantially outweigh the probative value, the
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expert testimony about "novel" scientific evidence will assist the
jury. Although courts generally agree on one factor that must be
present in the expert testimony in order to render it admissible-
that it adds to the common understanding of thejury145 -from this
common ground courts head in several directions when dealing with
"novel" scientific evidence.
The seeds for the divergence were planted in 1923 in the fa-
mous case of Frye v. United States. 146 The Frye case involved a rudi-
mentary polygraph device, the results of which the defendant
sought to have admitted at the trial, claiming that they tended to
show his innocence. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that the trial court had properly
refused to admit the evidence because there was no showing that the
validity of the technique had been generally accepted in the relevant
scientific community.
147
For several decades the Frye general acceptance test constituted
an unquestionably accepted principle of law in most jurisdictions
when the admissibility of "novel" scientific evidence was at issue.14
8
During the last decade, however, considerable criticism of the Frye
evidence will likewise not be of assistance to the trier of fact). Thus, this article for the
sake of convenience will focus on whether the evidence will assist the trier of fact under
FED. R. EVID. 701. The results of the suggested analysis should be the same, however,
whether the analysis is done in three steps under Rules 401, 701, and 403, or one step
under Rule 701.
145 See, e.g., State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 604, 645 P.2d 1130, 1336 (1982). The Advi-
sory Committee Note supports this requirement:
There is no more certain test for determining when experts may be used than the
common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to deter-
mine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without en-
lightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved
in the dispute.
FED. RULE EvID. 701 Advisory Committee Note (quoting Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND.
L. REV. 414, 418 (1952)).
The common phraseology that the subject matter must be "beyond the ken" of the
trier of fact can be misleading if it is construed to mean that the subject matter must be
entirely removed from the trier of fact's common experience. Note the language "and
to the best possible degree" in the Advisory Committee Note. See also Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industry Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313, 1330 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
146 Id.
147 Id. at 1014.
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimen-
tal and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone
the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go
a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be suffi-
ciently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belongs.
Id.
148 See, Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a
Half-Centwy Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980). Gianelli points out, however, that
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rule has developed. 149 The emerging major alternative mode of
analysis is referred to as "relevance analysis" and seeks to treat
"novel" scientific evidence in the same way that other expert testi-
mony is treated, by weighing its probative value and helpfulness
against the countervailing dangers of unfair prejudice and confusion
of issues. Its earliest major scholarly proponent was Professor Mc-
Cormick i5 0 and the position has been reinforced and fleshed out by
a recent influential treatise in the field.'
5 '
The problems arising from the Frye rule are compounded when
the "novel" scientific evidence at issue is "novel" psychological evi-
dence. Both the Frye rule and "relevance analysis" as currently for-
mulated are more easily and more often applied to "hard" scientific
evidence, such as neutron activation analysis,' 5 2 and gas chro-
matograph analysis.153 "Novel" psychological evidence, which is
"soft" and subjective, is a relative newcomer to the Frye scene,
although it now seems to have arrived with a vengeance. Examples
of such testimony offered over the last decade include rape trauma
syndrome, 54 battered wife syndrome, 155 battered parent syn-
drome,15 6 Vietnam veterans' syndrome,' 57 and testimony regarding
the fallibility of eyewitness identifications. 158 The courts have de-
courts could and did avoid applying the rule simply by not considering particular expert
testimony as "scientific." Id. at 1219.
149 The criticisms of the Frye rule and the alternatives that courts have proposed are
admirably analyzed in McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibil-
ity, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879, 886-905 (1982).
150 C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 491 (2d ed. 1972).
151 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, 702[03] (1982). Indeed,
there are some commentators who argue as a matter of statutory construction that since
there is no mention of the Frye rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Federal Rules
did not incorporate it. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 5168 (1978). Even those who do not advocate abandoning Frye sometimes try to
tinker with it. For example, one commentator has suggested that substantial acceptance,
rather than general acceptance, should be required. J. RICHARDSON, MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 2.5 at 24 (2d ed. 1974). Some courts have equated the general acceptance of
a technique with a showing of reliability. See cases cited in McCormick, supra note 149, at
892 n.83 (1982).
152 See Karjala, The Evidntiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 997
(1971).
153 United States v. Distler, 671 F.2d 954, 961-62 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827
(1981).
154 See McCord, supra note 47.
155 Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979); State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio
St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981); Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women
Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 121 (1985).
156 State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1981).
157 PTSD: Effective Representation of a Vietnam V'eteran in the Criminal Justice System, 68
MARq. L. REV. 647 (1985).
158 Admission of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1402
(1985).
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vised varying approaches concerning how to deal with such "novel"
psychological evidence.
One approach is to adhere strictly to the Frye general accept-
ance rule. With respect to "novel" psychological evidence, courts
have applied the Frye rule to rape trauma syndrome, 159 battered wife
syndrome, 160 and battered parent syndrome. 161 Another approach,
under "relevance analysis," is to propose lists of factors to guide
courts in determining whether the evidence will assist the trier of
fact.' 62 Other courts, without resorting to either Frye or "relevance
159 State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn 1982); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235
(Mo. 1984).
160 Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d 626; Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137.
161 Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58.
162 Relevance analysis proponents have not focused on the applicability of their analy-
sis to psychological evidence. There is no reason to suppose, however, that they would
be loathe to apply their analysis to psychological evidence.
J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 151, at 702[03] proposes seven guidelines:
(1) The technique's general acceptance in the field;
(2) The expert's qualifications and stature;
(3) The use which has been made of the technique;
(4) The potential rate of error;
(5) The existence of specialized literature;
(6) The novelty of the invention; and
(7) The extent to which the technique relies on the subjective interpretation of the
expert.
Justice McCormick in McCormick, supra note 149, at 911-12 lists eleven factors:
(1) The potential error rate in using the technique;
(2) The existence and maintenance of standards governing its use;
(3) Presence of safeguards in the characteristics of the technique;
(4) Analogy to other scientific techniques whose results are admissible;
(5) The extent to which the technique has been accepted by scientists in the field
involved;
(6) The nature and breadth of the inference adduced;
(7) The clarity and simplicity with which the technique can be described and its
results explained;
(8) The extent to which the basic data are verifiable by the court and jury;
(9) The availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique;
(10) The probative significance of the evidence in the circumstances of the case;
(11) The care with which the technique was applied in the case.
See United States v. Clifford, 543 F. Supp. 424, 430 (W.D. Pa. 1982), which relied on
six factors in rejecting expert forensic linguistic testimony: (1) no other court cases had
permitted such testimony; (2) the users of the technique were not satisfied that tech-
nique was reliable; (3) the expert involved used subjective judgment in assigning signifi-
cance to results (speculative); (4) potential for misleading jury (prejudicial value too
great); (5) no conformity with generally accepted scientific theory; (6) no qualified ex-
pert to present tojury. See also, State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 84-85, cerl. denied, 450 U.S.
927 (Iowa 1982) upholding the admission of blood spatter expert testimony after con-
sidering nine factors: (1) Weaknesses pointed out by cross-examination and adequate
instructions; (2) expert's qualifications; (3) existence of extensive training organizations;
(4) professional organizations; (5) academic programs; (6) professional use; (7) semi-
nars; (8) extensive literature; (9) complexity of subject matter and understandability af-
ter expert's presentation.
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analysis," have formulated their own approaches such as asking
whether the state of the art or scientific knowledge permits assertion
of a reasonable opinion, 163 or asking whether the information or
opinion is the product of an explicable and reliable system of
analysis.' 4
In summary, the state of the law with respect to the admissibil-
ity of "novel" psychological evidence in general, and evidence con-
cerning the psychology of child sexual abuse complainants in
particular, is confused. The basic choices for analyzing the admissi-
bility of such evidence are (1) adhere to the Frye rule, (2) adopt "rel-
evance analysis," or (3) construct a different analytical framework.
This article argues for the third alternative. Although both the Frye
rule and "relevance analysis" as currently formulated have helpful
aspects to determine the admissibility of psychological testimony,
neither of the approaches perfectly fits this type of evidence.
The Frye rule furthers two valid objectives. It serves to assure
that only scientific evidence that is reliable will be placed before the
jury. 65 Additionally, the general acceptance standard tends to as-
sure that there will be a pool of available experts to which the oppo-
nent of the evidence can resort for advice and testimony.' 66 On the
other hand, there are four serious drawbacks to the use of the Frye
rule with respect to "novel" psychological evidence. First, how to
apply the Frye rule is often not entirely dear. It is not always clear
what evidence is "scientific" and what evidence is not. 167 Further, it
is unclear whether Frye requires general acceptance of the underly-
ing scientific principle, the scientific technique employed, or
both.168 Second, the Frye rule's exclusive focus on general accept-
Finally, see People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236
(1984) holding that the trial judge abused his discretion by excluding expert testimony
regarding the fallibility of eyewitness testimony, relying on five factors: (1) the existence
of an extensive body of knowledge and trained experts in that subject; (2) abstention of
judgment as to whether this witness' testimony is truthful; (3) limiting the testimony to
the particular facts before the jury; (4) making the relationship clear between facts and
expert's specialized knowledge; (5) jury well aware of its ability to reject or decrease
weight of proffer.
163 United States v. Winters, 729 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1984).
164 State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 601, 606, 645 P.2d 1330, 1336 (1982).
165 See, e.g., United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042
(1975); Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474, 479 (Alaska 1970); People v. Bynum, 192 Colo.
60, 62, 556 P.2d 469, 470 (1976); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 536, 432 A.2d 86, 91
(1981).
166 United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974); People v. Kelly,
17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976).
167 See McCord, supra note 47, at 1181-89.
168 Gianelli, supra note 148, at 1211; Symposium on Science and the Rides of Evidence, 99
F.R.D. 208, 230 (remarks by Prof. Margaret Berger).
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ance diverts attention from other important questions regarding the
admissibility of expert testimony. 169 Third, the bedrock rationale of
the Frye rule-to assure that the jury can rationally and intelligently
weigh the evidence-leads to the conclusion that the rule is not even
appropriate for simple, easily understood types of psychological ex-
pert testimony, which is by its very nature subjective and therefore
not likely to overwhelm the jury. 170 Lastly, requiring general ac-
ceptance may deprive the trier of fact of helpful evidence both be-
cause of the lag time that is inevitably entailed in gaining general
acceptance, and because psychological evidence by virtue of its sub-
jective nature may have a more difficult time gaining general accept-
ance than will an objective, mechanical technique. Indeed, very few
concepts are generally accepted by all behavioral scientists.
"Relevance analysis" has two virtues. First, by treating "novel"
scientific evidence like all other expert testimony, rather than apply-
ing a special test to it as does the Frye rule, it promotes uniformity of
analysis regarding the admissibility of expert testimony. Second,
"relevance analysis" explicitly recognizes that there are many im-
portant factors that bear on the admissibility of expert testimony
regarding "novel" scientific evidence other than whether it is gener-
ally accepted in the scientific community. "Relevance analysis," as it
has been formulated, however, is also deficient in two respects in its
application to "novel" psychological evidence. First, the factors that
its proponents list are too specific and do not necessarily lead to an
analysis of the critical factors. 171 Second, several of the factors thus
far suggested are not particularly pertinent with respect to psycho-
logical evidence' 72 while some important factors regarding psycho-
169 See infra text accompanying notes 173-91.
170 This sort of evidence has been referred to as "software" scientific evidence:
This is the sort of evidence least likely to awe the jury. When a layperson thinks of
science, the layperson naturally thinks of sophisticated instruments capable of pre-
cise management. Software techniques are the farthest removed from the layper-
son's conception of science; and for that reason, in the minds of many laypersons
these techniques hardly deserve the august title, "scientific." The element of sub-
jectivity in these techniques is patent to any juror.
Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evid'nce-A Pthimer on Evaluating the
Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 261, 283 (1981).
For a more detailed discussion why the Frye rule should not apply to software psy-
chological evidence, see McCord, supra note 47, at 1181-89.
171 See supra note 162.
172 For example, the seven guideline analysis inJ. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note
151, 702[03] uses the terms "technique" and "invention," which connote "hard" scien-
tific tests. A focus on "technique" with respect to psychological evidence will often be
largely unproductive, since often the technique involved is simple interviews. This tech-
nique is certainly a generally accepted means by the behavioral scientific community of
gaining information, but a focus on technique misses the point, which is whether the
conclusions drawn from the intervie.w are valid. Similarly, many of the eleven factors in
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logical evidence are not mentioned at all.
A better approach is to ask what general factors have a bearing
on whether expert testimony "will assist" the jury. A review of the
case law and commentary suggests that there are four general fac-
tors that should be considered: necessity, reliability, understand-
ability and importance.
The necessity factor simply means that the court should inquire
how necessary the offered testimony is in the context of the case. 173
There are four sub-inquiries that will usually be helpful in ascertain-
ing whether expert testimony is necessary. First, the subject matter
may be one on which the ordinary juror would likely benefit from
expert assistance because it is not a matter of common, everyday
experience. 74 Second, the testimony may be necessary in order to
counter existing irrational prejudices that may exist in an ordinary
juror. This issue may have particular force in sex offense prosecu-
tions. 17 5 Third, often facts which do not need expert explanation if
they are not attacked by the opponent may need expert explanation
if they are attacked in certain ways by the opponent. For example,
testimony of a child complainant that she was abused by a relative
might not on its face necessitate an expert explanation, but if the
witness is thereafter cross-examined regarding an alleged earlier re-
cantation of the accusation, then the necessity for expert testimony
to explain that child sexual abuse victims often recant is more neces-
sary.17 6 A fourth reason why expert testimony may be necessary is
to counter exceptional jury instructions, such as an instruction high-
lighting the assumed fallibility of child witnesses. 77 An overarching
inquiry regarding necessity is whether there exist alternative means
of proving the matter on which the expert testimony is offered.
The reliability factor, as its name suggests, involves an inquiry
into how reliable the expert testimony is likely to be. 178 This impor-
McCormick, supra note 149, at 911-12 relate to "technique" and seem to be more appli-
cable to "hard" scientific tests.
173 Note that necessity in this analysis is not viewed as an all-or-nothing concept, with
the testimony viewed as either absolutely necessary or not necessary at all. Rather, it is
viewed as a relative concept which envisions degrees of necessity such as: highly neces-
sary, moderately necessary, not very necessary, etc.
174 This is a familiar requirement for the admission of expert testimony. See supra note
145 and accompanying text.
175 It is argued in McCord, supra note 47, at 1202-03, that one reason expert rape
trauma syndrome testimony should be admissible in rape prosecutions involving adult
complainants is that there exists in many jurors the irrational prejudice that many rape
victims "bring it on themselves."
176 See infra text accompanying notes 301-05.
177 See infra text accompanying note 203.
178 Although "reliability" is usually discussed by courts as a unitary concept, behav-
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tant factor is recognized by both the Frye test 179 and "relevance
analysis."' 80  There are two specific sub-inquiries that will usually
be important with respect to this factor. First, often the extent of
general acceptance accorded by the pertinent scientific community
to an expert's conclusion will be probative of reliability because,
although scientific communities are not infallible, usually general
acceptance connotes reliability. 18' Second, the error rate of the
technique needs to be examined. 182 An important question that re-
lates both to general acceptance and to error rate is to what extent
the expert's conclusion is subjective. 183 Generally speaking, the
more subjective the conclusion is, the more difficult it will be to
make a case for general acceptance. Further, if the conclusion is
subjective, there may be either a greater likelihood of a substantial
error rate, or the error rate may be impossible to calculate. Interest-
ingly, while the subjectivity of the conclusion tends toward inadmis-
sibility as a matter of reliability, it cuts in favor of admission with
respect to understandability 184 because it does not have the poten-
tial to overwhelm a jury as does an objective conclusion that pur-
ports to be highly reliable.
Understandability refers to the ability of the trier of fact to under-
stand the testimony and to give it proper weight. There are five
sub-inquiries that help to illuminate this factor. First, how far re-
moved from the jurors' common experience is the subject matter of
the testimony? The closer it is to their common understanding, the
more likely they are to comprehend it.185 Second, the clarity and
simplicity with which the conclusion can be explained is an impor-
ioral scientists correctly perceive that it has two components: validity and consistency.
"Validity" refers to a test's ability to measure what it purports to measure, i.e., is it accu-
rate? "Consistency" (technically referred to by scientists as "reliability," but called
"consistency" here to avoid confusion) refers to the percentage of cases in which in-
dependent examiners will draw the same conclusion from the test. Imwinkelried, supra
note 170, at 279.
179 See supra text accompanying note 165.
180 See supra note 162.
181 See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1236 n.14, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985).
182 j. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 151 and 162, specifically focus on this as the
fourth factor in their suggested list of inquiries. McCormick, supra note 149, specifically
focuses on this as the first factor in his list.
183 j. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 151, focus on this as the seventh factor in
their suggested list of inquiries.
184 See supra text accompanying notes 189-90.
185 McCormick, supra notes 149 and 162, suggests this inquiry by his eighth factor, i.e.,
the extent to which the basic data relied upon by the expert is verifiable by the court and
jury. See People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d 100, 110-11, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 356
(1975)(expert testimony regarding bitemark comparison involves a subject not far from
the jurors' common experience a substantial factor in favor of admissibility); Hall, 297
N.W.2d at 86 (same reasoning on expert testimony regarding blood spatters).
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tant factor.' 8 6 Third, the availability of experts for the opponent's
use in order to put the conclusion into perspective for the jury
should be considered. 187 Fourth, the availability of a specialized
literature concerning the subject matter of the testimony allowing
opposing counsel to become familiar with the subject and to effec-
tively cross-examine the proponent's expert is an important in-
quiry.' 88 Fifth, a court needs to ask to what extent the testimony
may have the tendency to overwhelm the jury.189 As was noted
above, the more subjective the conclusion the less likely it is to over-
whelm the jury.190
The last factor to consider is the importance of the expert testi-
mony. This refers to how crucial the point is, in the circumstances
of the case, on which the expert testimony is being offered. If the
expert opinion, if believed, would be dispositive or virtually disposi-
tive of the case, that affects the admissibility analysis differently than
if the testimony, even if believed, does not dictate the disposition of
the case.1 91
This four-factor analysis has the virtue of providing a single
framework that accommodates all important issues bearing on ad-
missibility. It also has the virtue of demonstrating the interaction
among the factors. One example of that interaction has already
been noted: while the subjective nature of a conclusion undercuts
its admissibility on the reliability factor, it aids its admissibility on
the understandability factor. Another important relationship exists
between reliability and importance: the greater the importance of
the expert testimony, the greater should be the guarantees of its
reliability. On the other hand, if the testimony is less important,
then usually the court should be willing to accept a lesser degree of
reliability. Yet another important relationship exists between relia-
bility and necessity. For example, if the evidence has become neces-
186 McCormick, supra notes 149 and 162, includes this as the seventh factor on his list.
187 This is one of the objectives sought to be secured by the Fye test, see supra text
accompanying note 166. McCormick, supra notes 149 and 162, includes this as the ninth
factor on his list.
188 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra notes 151 and 162, include this as the fifth of
their seven factors.
189 With respect to "novel" scientific evidence, this concern most often surfaces re-
garding polygraph evidence. The concern has surfaced with respect to psychological
evidence, however, particularly with respect to rape trauma syndrome evidence. See
State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982) and State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235
(Mo. 1984).
190 See supra text accompanying note 183.
191 Factors six and ten of the analysis of McCormick, supra notes 149 and 162, speak to
this concern. Those factors are, respectively, the nature and breadth of the inference
drawn, and the probative significance of the evidence in the circumstances of the case.
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sary because the opponent chose to cross-examine regarding a
particular point, then usually the court should be willing to tolerate
a lesser degree of reliability since the proponent in a sense has been
forced to offer the evidence, and the opponent has in a sense
"brought it on himself." The interaction among these factors ne-
cessitates that the court perform a balancing test to determine
whether the testimony will assist the jury. Thus, the recommended
admissibility analysis is to analyze the factors and then to balance
them to determine whether admission of the evidence will assist the
jury. It should be noted that this analytical framework should also
be helpful with respect to other kinds of "novel" psychological
evidence.
2. Regarding Expert Diagnosis of Child Sexual Abuse
Having established a framework for analyzing admissibility, that
framework should now be applied to expert testimony diagnosing a
complainant as a victim of sexual abuse.
Necessity: The first sub-inquiry is whether the effects upon chil-
dren of sexual abuse is a subject matter where expert testimony
would likely assist the ordinary juror. Common sense dictates that
the answer to this question is yes. To most people the topic of child
sexual abuse is unfamiliar and mysterious. There is no reason to
believe that most people would understand what effects sexual
abuse has on a child and how those effects might be detected. Thus,
this basis of necessity exists.
The second sub-inquiry is whether the testimony is necessary to
counteract irrational prejudices that might exist in the minds of the
jury. Two sources of possible irrational prejudices exist in child sex-
ual abuse cases: the nature of the case and the nature of the witness.
The nature of the case is that the crime charged is a sex offense.
Although with respect to most charges, there exist no easily identifi-
able irrational juror prejudices, sex offense prosecutions are differ-
ent: there is good reason to suspect that some well-defined
prejudices exist in this area.
One likely prejudice is against sex complainants who do any-
thing less than resist to the point of incurring physical injury. This
prejudice certainly seems to exist with respect to adult complainants
in rape cases, where research has shown that many jurors entertain
''a popular prejudice on the subject of sexual assault ... that victims
wish, on some level, to be raped or that victims, because of some
imputed moral flaw, deserve to be raped, and that the failure to re-
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sist to the utmost reveals the existence of this complicity. ." 192
Does this "popular prejudice" exist only with respect to adult com-
plainants? Although there has been very little research done in this
area, the one recent study that has addressed the topic concluded:
Another surprising find from the study concerns the matter of con-
sent. In spite of laws that assume the contrary, the public apparently
does feel that children bear substantial responsibility in matters of sex-
ual conduct with older persons. The respondents in this survey
tended to downgrade the abusiveness of any situation where the child
did anything less than object strenuously. This finding held true even
in the case of very young children.'
9 3
The author concluded, "undoubtedly some of this prejudice
[against adult complainants] transfers to people's thinking when the
victims are children as well as when the victims are adults."' 9 4 It is
to be doubted, however, whether the prejudice exists to the same
extent with respect to child complainants, since jurors probably at-
tribute less responsibility to a child than to an adult.
Another possible irrational prejudice arising from the nature of
the case is the disinclination of jurors to believe that child sexual
abuse is anything other than a rare occurrence and/or to disbelieve
that a child is likely to be abused by someone the child knows.
Again, there has been very little research on this topic, but the one
study that has been done concluded that for the most part, the po-
tential jury pool is surprisingly well-informed about the topic of
child sexual abuse. The researcher began by noting:
Books and articles on the subject of child sexual abuse regularly start
by debunking the popular "myths" about the problem. Among the
most commonly targeted myths are: that children are molested pri-
marily by strangers; that girls are the exclusive targets of sexual abuse;
and that the abusers are violent, aggressive, senile, or mentally ill [cita-
tions omitted].' 9 5
The researcher then went on to note that nobody had ever at-
tempted to empirically establish that these myths were indeed prev-
alent.196 The researcher performed such a study, which showed that
all but one of these myths was not widespread.' 9 7 The one excep-
192 D. FINKELHOR, supra note 3, at 119. See also, McCord, supra note 47, at 1202-04.
193 D. FINKELHOR, supra note 3, at 119.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 87.
196 Id.
197 Taken together, the findings reported from this survey suggest that the public is
relatively knowledgeable and concerned about the problem of sexual abuse. Par-
ents ranked it as a serious problem affecting children. They also believed it to be
alarmingly common.
They seemed to be aware of some of the most important realities about sexual
abuse: the fact that it affects both boys and girls, the fact that it occurs at hands of
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tion was that many people tended to associate the notion of sexual
abuse with strangers to the child. 198
Even though the respondents were substantially on the low side
in their estimates of the percentage of abuse attributable to non-
strangers, they were not, however, wildly off-base. 199 Thus, there
may be some moderate necessity for expert testimony when the de-
fendant is a relative or acquaintance of the complainant.
The second possible source of irrational prejudice separate
from the nature of the case is the nature of the witnesses: the complain-
ant is a child and the defendant is an adult. Adults may tend to
disbelieve child witnesses simply because they are children, or may
tend to irrationally discount a child's testimony if it is contradicted
by an adult.20 0 Whether these prejudices exist, and whether if they
do exist they are irrational, will be discussed in detail later in this
article. 20 1 It is sufficient to note here that expert testimony may be
necessary to counteract these prejudices.
20 2
The third sub-inquiry under the necessity factor is the extent to
which expert testimony is made necessary by the actions of the op-
trusted family members, the fact that it can happen to young children, the fact that it
involves fondling and touching as well as intercourse, the fact that many children do
not tell, the fact that it can take place without brute force being used. Some of the
classic myths about sexual abuse cited by professionals do not seem highly preva-
lent ....
Id. at 98-99.
198 On one important matter, however, misconception appeared to prevail. There
was still a large group of people who tended to associate the notion of sexual abuse
primarily with strangers rather than people known to the child. The problem here,
we guess, is not entirely one of misinformation. If the public has gotten other accu-
rate information about sexual abuse, it has certainly heard 
the truth that abusers are
more likely to be intimates than strangers. The problem 
is, rather, that this truth is
a very difficult one to accept. It is unpleasant for people to harbor suspicions aboutfriends, neighbors, relatives, members of their own family. So people continue to
hold the image of the sexual abuser as a stranger, because the other image is so
disconcerting.
Id.
199 When asked what type of offender came to mind when the term sexual abuse was
mentioned, fifty percent of the respondents said a stranger, twenty-two percent a rela-
tive, and twenty-eight percent someone known to the child other than a relative. Id. at
90. When asked to rate the most probable offenders, thirty-five percent of the respon-
dents said a stranger, twenty-eight percent a step-parent, twenty-two percent a parent,
and thirteen percent a friend or acquaintance of the child. . at 104. Compare these
percentages with the best guesses of professionals in the area, supra text accompanying
notes 17-26.
200 The most forceful advocacy of this position occurs in Summitt, supra note 17, at
187: "Attorneys know that the uncorroborated testimony of a child will not convict a
respectable adult. The test in criminal court requires specific proof 'beyond a reason-
able doubt,' and every reasonable adult juror will have reason to doubt the child's fan-
tastic claims."
201 See infra text accompanying notes 232-63.
202 Goodman, Golding & Haith, Jurors' Reactions to Child Witnesses, 401. Soc. IssuEs
139, 141,151 (1984).
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ponent. In most cases the opponent's main line of defense is to dis-
credit the child. Accordingly, in most cases there will be some
necessity for expert testimony to buttress the child's credibility as a
result of this defense posture.
The fourth sub-inquiry under the necessity factor is whether the
court is going to give cautionary instructions to the jury concerning
the credibility of the child witness. Although the requirement that
such instructions be given in a sexual abuse case has virtually disap-
peared, there is still case law in many jurisdictions allowing the
judge in his discretion to give a cautionary instruction regarding the
child witness. 203 If the court plans to give such an instruction, then
the necessity for expert testimony increases.
In summary, there may be some necessity for expert testimony
under all four of the necessity inquiries: the subject matter is likely
to be beyond the ken of the trier of fact, the trier of fact may have
irrational prejudices, the opponent's actions may have made expert
testimony necessary and, jury instructions may also increase neces-
sity. Overarching the necessity inquiry, however, is the question of
whether there are equally acceptable or better alternatives to expert
testimony in the nature of a diagnosis that the complainant has been
sexually abused. With respect to some of the species of necessity
there do exist alternative forms of expert testimony. For example,
for those species of necessity related to the abilities of a child as a
witness, recourse may be had to testimony regarding the general
capabilities of children as witnesses. 20 4 With regard to particular
points made by the defendant with respect to the child witness, for
instance that she recanted the allegation after having made it, or
that her delay in reporting the abuse is indicative of falsehood, re-
sort may be had to general testimony that such behavior is not un-
common among sexual abuse victims. 20 5 These types of general
testimony have the virtue of not being dispositive of the case if the
jury believes them. This means that a lesser showing of necessity
and reliability may be required for them than for testimony that the
child has been abused, which, if believed, is virtually dispositive of
the case. However, for some of the species of necessity, like the
misperception that strangers are the most likely abusers, the most
likely form of expert testimony would be a recitation of the percent-
age of abusers who are known to the child. Courts have unani-
203 For a good review of the case law, see 32 A.L.R. 4th 1196.
204 For an in-depth discussion of such testimony, see infra text accompanying notes
323-26.
205 For an in-depth discussion of such testimony, see infra text accompanying notes
296-317.
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mously and properly ruled that testimony in this form is
inadmissible because it is improper character testimony and because
it tends to convict a defendant on the basis of statistics. 206 As to
expert testimony which is necessary and as to which there exists no
unobjectionable or less objectionable alternative, the question then
becomes whether, after balancing the other factors, the testimony
should be admitted.
Reliability: The first sub-inquiry under this factor is the general
acceptance of the validity of the result by other experts in the field.
The behavioral scientific literature conclusively demonstrates that
there is no general acceptance of the ability of experts in the field to
diagnose a child as having been sexually abused. 2
0 7
The second reliability sub-inquiry is the error rate of the ex-
pert's conclusions that a child has been sexually abused. Here a co-
nundrum arises, because although experts have no good basis for
diagnosing a child as sexually abused, nonetheless their error rate is
likely to be relatively small. The reason for this seeming anomaly is
that in making their diagnoses, the experts are working with a sam-
ple population which is quite heavily stacked in their favor. This is
so because there is every reason to believe that false reports of child
sexual abuse are very rare. Although it is probably impossible to
verify this observation empirically, as a matter of common sense and
human experience it must be true. Most people simply do not make
false crime reports.20 8 It is even more unlikely that sex crimes will
be falsely reported, given their intimate and embarrassing nature.
20 9
In the field of child sexual abuse the perception that false reports
are rare is shared by almost all commentators. 2 10 Thus, when faced
with a child who claims to have been sexually abused, the expert is
likely to diagnose the child as sexually abused, and is likely to be
correct. This accuracy is not a result of any expertise on the part of
the examiner, but is simply a function of the fact that statistically the
expert virtually cannot go wrong. Should this non-expertise based
accuracy give this testimony a high score on the reliability scale? It
seems that it should not, since an expert who claims to be able to
206 See supra note 105.
207 See supra text accompanying notes 106-33.
208 Most estimates are that less than five percent of crime reports are arguably ques-
tionable. See McCord, supra note 47, at 1196.
209 Courts have recognized this fact with respect to adult rape victims. See McCord,
supra note 47, at 1195 n.343.
210 L. STUART &J. GREER, supra note 24, at 57; Goodwin, Sahd, & Rada, Incest Hoax:
False Accusations, False Denials, 6 BULL. OF THE AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE L. 269
(1978); Rosenfeld, Nadelson & Krieger, supra note 119, at 159; Summitt, supra note 17,
at 179, 190-91.
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diagnose sexually abused children will claim to have made the diag-
nosis on the basis of that expertise, not on the basis of statistical
probabilities. The reliability of the testimony should be judged on
the basis the expert claims for making the diagnosis. On that basis,
it is not demonstrably reliable.
Understandability: The first sub-inquiry under this factor is how
far the testimony is beyond the ordinary experience of thejury. The
testimony is not far removed from the common experience of the
jury because it does not involve any mysterious or arcane tests or
procedures. For the same reason, the second sub-inquiry cuts in
favor of admissibility: the procedures and diagnosis can be ex-
plained to the trier of fact with relative clarity and simplicity.
On the third and fourth sub-inquiries-the availability of other
experts and specialized literature for the opponent's use-the testi-
mony does not score so high. Most persons who are "experts" re-
garding child sexual abuse work in social service agencies which
exist for the purpose of treating sexually abused children. For the
most part, it is unlikely that such persons will agree to serve as de-
fense experts regarding the fallibility of expert testimony regarding
child sexual abuse. Whether specialized literature is available to as-
sist the defense in preparing for cross-examination of the prosecu-
tion's expert depends upon how much time and effort in research
the defense lawyer can afford. An abundance of specialized litera-
ture showing the fallibility of expert testimony does exist in this
area.21 1 In practical terms, however, the literature is scattered
throughout periodicals that are obscure and hard for a legal practi-
tioner to obtain. Thus, while a defendant who is able to bankroll an
impeccable defense will make it possible for his attorney to expend
the time necessary to track down the various behavioral scientific
articles, a less wealthy defendant may not be able to afford such
research.
The last sub-inquiry under understandability is whether the tes-
timony would have a tendency to overwhelm the jury. Although the
concept of "unfair prejudice" is one of the fundamental tenets of
the rules of evidence, there has been very little research done to
determine what kinds of evidence tend to have such an impact on a
trier of fact that the trier of fact cannot thereafter give that evidence
the weight to which it would rationally be entitled.2 12 Thus, the
211 See, e.g., authorities cited supra notes 106-33.
212 The National Science Foundation Law and Social Science Project has recently be-
gun some research in this field. See, e.g., Leitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere &Johnson, Evalu-
ating the Prejudicial Effect of Evidence: Can Judges Identify the Impact of Inproper Evidence on
Juries?, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1147 (1983).
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judgment that a certain type of evidence has the potential for "un-
fairly prejudicing" the jury is usually based on tradition and
hunches. Courts have traditionally suspected that some types of ex-
pert testimony have such an impact on the trier of fact that the jury
will simply succumb to the power of the evidence. 2 13 While it is im-
possible to say with any certainty exactly what types of expert testi-
mony may have a tendency to overwhelm the trier of fact, it would
seem that testimony about a subject not far removed from the trier
of fact's common experience, explainable in simple terms, and
which the opponent has a fair opportunity to put into perspective by
presenting another expert, or by a searching cross-examination,
should not be unfairly prejudicial. While an expert diagnosis that a
child has been sexually abused is not far removed from the jury's
common experience and can be explained in simple terms, it has
been pointed out above that there exists a substantial question as to
whether most opponents of that evidence would have an opportu-
nity to put it into perspective for the jury. To the extent that the
opponent does not have an opportunity, and the testimony remains
unchallenged, then there does exist the potential that the jury will
accede to the conclusion reached by the expert.
Importance: The last factor to be considered is the importance of
the issue on which the expert testimony is being offered. It is clear
that a diagnosis that a child has been sexually abused is offered on
an issue of crucial importance in a child sexual abuse prosecution.
Indeed, generally speaking, there are only two major issues in a
child sexual abuse case: has the child been sexually abused? and
was the abuse perpetrated by the defendant?21 4 A diagnosis that the
child has been sexually abused, if believed, is dispositive of the first
of these issues.
Balancing: Having identified issues concerning the necessity, re-
liability, understandability and importance of an expert diagnosis
213 This hunch has been particularly powerful with respect to polygraph expert testi-
mony. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 297 Or. 404, 440-41, 687 P.2d 751, 775-77 (1984).
However, even here, where the hunch seems particularly reasonable from a common
sense standpoint, empirical research seems to show that the hunch is wrong. Several
studies have shown that juries frequently are willing and able to reject polygraphers'
opinions and return verdicts inconsistent with the polygraphers' conclusions. See, e.g.,
Markwart & Lynch, The Effect of Polygraph Evidence on Mock Jwy Decision-Making, 7 POLICE
Sci. & ADMIN. 324 (1979); Peters, A Survey of Polygraph Evidence in Criminal Tiials, 68
A.B.A.J. 162 (1982).
Courts have been impressed by the unfair prejudice argument in rape trauma syn-
drome cases. See e.g., State v. Saldana; 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982); State v. Tay-
lor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Mo. 1984).
214 Often the first issue will be the only one in practicality, since in many cases there
will be no other realistic candidate as abuser than the defendant.
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that a child has been sexually abused, it remains to weigh those fac-
tors and determine whether such testimony should be admissible.
Although the results of some sub-inquiries weigh in favor of admis-
sion, the balance clearly tips in favor of inadmissibility. Two factors
stand out clearly: the importance of the issue on which the testi-
mony is being offered is high, while the reliability of the diagnosis is
low. It does not comport with our notions of criminal justice to per-
mit a defendant to be convicted on the basis of such unreliable evi-
dence. Accordingly, the decisions holding such testimony to be
inadmissible constitute the better line of authority.
III. THE USE OF AN EXPERT TO VOUCH FOR THE COMPLAINANT'S
CREDIBILITY REGARDING THE SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATION
The case law shows two ways in which an expert's opinion has
been used by the prosecution to vouch for the complainant's credi-
bility regarding the sexual abuse allegation. The first is by an opin-
ion from the expert that the complainant is telling the truth. The
second is by an opinion from the expert that it is rare for a child to
fabricate or fantasize a claim of sexual abuse. The common denomi-
nator of these two types of opinion is that the expert is opining that
the complainant is almost certainly telling the truth. Expert testi-
mony vouching for the complainant's credibility is to be contrasted
with expert testimony enhancing the complainant's credibility by ex-
plaining some fact regarding the child's testimony.215 Explanatory
testimony used to enhance the complainant's credibility does not
constitute a direct opinion by the expert that the child is telling, or
is likely to be telling the truth.
A. BY AN OPINION THAT THE COMPLAINANT IS TELLING THE TRUTH
1. Case Law
The case of State v. Kim, 216 has wholeheartedly embraced the
notion of an expert giving an opinion that the complainant is telling
the truth. 21 7 The Hawaii Supreme Court in that case upheld the
215 See infra text accompanying notes 296-326.
216 64 Haw. 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982). For the prior discussion of this case, see supra
text accompanying notes 59-67.
217 In two other cases such testimony was held to have been properly admitted, but
the courts were careful to indicate that this was only because of certain actions or inac-
tions of the defendant in the cases before them. In People v. Ashley, 687 P.2d 473
(Colo. App. 1984), the court found that the defendant had "opened the door" by asking
the expert on cross-examination why she had failed to use a "rape kit" to verify the
abuse. Further, the defendant had then failed to object to the expert's answer: "be-
cause the child was telling me the truth as to who the assailant was." Id. at 475.
In State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984), the court asserted that although as
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admissibility of the testimony against the defendant's objections
that it invaded the province of the jury, was not a proper subject for
expert opinion, and that its probative value was outweighed by its
prejudicial effect. The court believed that the testimony was based
on a sound factual foundation, that the inference was the product of
an explicable and reliable system of analysis, and that the expert
opinion added to the common understanding of the jury. Thus, it
held that the trial judge had not abused his discretion in admitting
the evidence.
218
On the other hand, the remainder of the courts considering the
question have ruled the testimony inadmissible. The rationale most
often mentioned by these courts is that the testimony invades the
province of the jury, which alone is responsible for determining the
credibility of witnesses. 2 19 Another frequently mentioned basis is
that the testimony constitutes an "impermissible bolstering" of the
complainant's testimony where the complainant's testimony had not
been sufficiently attacked to permit bolstering.220 One court held
a general rule it would reject expert opinion testimony regarding the truth or falsity of a
witness' allegations about a crime because the expert's status may lend an unwarranted
stamp of scientific legitimacy to the allegations, in this case, "Having sought, however,
to discredit the child's credibility by showing that the child's mother (the ultimate ex-
pert' with respect to the complainant) did not believe her for several months, the de-
fendant must be said to have waived objection to responsive opinion testimony even
though elicited from an expert of a different kind." Id. at 611-12.
218 Kim, 64 Haw. at 600, 608-10, 645 P.2d at 1334, 1338-39.
219 State v. Miller, 377 N.W.2d 506, 508, (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); People v. Fogarty, 86
A.D.2d 617, 446 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (1982); Black v. State, 634 S.W.2d 356, 357 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1982); State v. Fitzgerald, 39 Wash. App. 652, 657, 694 P.2d 1117, 1211 (1985).
See also, State v. Tharp, 372 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985), where the court held that
the trial court had not erred in refusing to grant defendant's request for an order com-
pelling a psychological evaluation of the complainant to evaluate "intra-family dynamics
between stepfather and stepdaughter and its relation to the victim's credibility," Id. at
282, because such testimony might invade the jury's province to make credibility deter-
minations. Id. at 282.
220 People v. Ortega, 672 P.2d 215, 218 (Colo. App. 1983); Fogarty, 86 A.D.2d at 617,
446 N.Y.S.2d at 93; Black, 634 S.W.2d at 357-58. The courts are sometimes not clear
concerning how much of an attack is necessary before bolstering is permissible. The
statements in two of the cases are cryptic at best. In Ortega, the court stated that the
complainant's credibility "had not been attacked at this stage in the proceedings," with-
out explaining at which stage in the proceedings the testimony had been offered. Ortega,
672 P.2d at 218. In Commonwealth v. Carter, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 680, 403 N.E.2d 1191
(1980), the court simply noted without explanation that the testimony had been im-
proper. Id. at 681, 403 N.E.2d at 1192.
In Black, 634 S.W.2d 356, the Texas court's reasoning was clear: a witness' testi-
mony may not be bolstered simply because it may not be believed or because it has been
contradicted by another witness, nor may it be bolstered even if it has been attacked on
cross-examination if the witness has remained unwavering. Rather, "[olnly by placing a
witness in the position of having testified different [sic] from that which she had previ-
ously stated will one party be permitted to bolster its own case." Black, 634 S.W.2d at
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that the veracity of a complainant is not beyond the ken of an ordi-
nary juror.22' Finally, one court held that under its state's law, an
expert witness can only testify that an event could or might have
caused the injury, not that the event did in fact cause the injury,
unless his expertise leads him to that unmistakable conclusion.
Under that rule of law the expert's testimony that the complainant's
account "was reality" constituted an improper expression of an
opinion as to the defendant's guilt. 222 Thus, the clear weight of
authority is that an expert's opinion that a child sexual abuse com-
plainant is telling the truth should not be admissible, although the
rationales put forth to support that position vary considerably.
In one case, the shoe was on the other foot: rather than the
prosecution offering an expert opinion that the complainant was
telling the truth, the defense offered an expert to testify that the
complainants were lying.22 3 The trial court precluded the expert
from testifying and the appellate court affirmed, reasoning that
although the testimony would be allowable in a proper case, in this
case the trial court had not abused its discretion in deciding that
since the expert had never personally examined the complainant,
the prejudicial effect of the testimony outweighed its probative
value.
2 24
2. Behavioral Scientific Research
In theory, there is a distinct difference between an expert ren-
dering a diagnosis that a child has been sexually abused and an ex-
pert opining that the complainant is telling the truth. The first
opinion does not on its face concern the credibility of the complain-
ant; while on its face the second opinion directly comments upon
the credibility of the complainant. As a practical matter, however,
given that the major basis for a diagnosis that a child has been sexu-
ally abused is what the child tells the expert, there is really not much
difference between the two types of opinions. Three courts have
358. While this position has the virtue of clarity, it does not necessarily have the virtue
of correctness to the extent that it would not allow bolstering even after a scathing cross-
examination so long as the witness remained "unwavering." Compare FED. R. EVID.
608(a), which allows bolstering by an opinion as to the witness' truthfulness when the
character of the witness regarding truthfulness "has been attacked by opinion or reputa-
tion evidence, or otherwise." Id. (Emphasis added).
221 People v. Sergill, 138 Cal. App. 3d 34, 39, 187 Cal. Rptr. 497, 500 (1982). This
court also held that the alleged "experts", who were ordinary policemen, were not quali-
fied as experts regarding the credibility of complainants. Id. at 39, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
222 State v. Keen, 309 N.C. 158, 163-64, 305 S.E.2d 535, 538 (1983).
223 State v. Tafoya, 94 N.M. 762, 617 P.2d 151 (1980).
224 Id. at 763-64, 617 P.2d at 153.
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recognized this.225 Thus, it is pertinent to incorporate here the re-
search indicating that experts cannot reliably diagnose a child as
having been sexually abused. 226
Behavioral scientists have also recognized that determining the
credibility of a child sexual abuse complainant is not a task for which
they are particularly well equipped. The simplest and most forth-
right statement to be found by a behavioral scientist regarding this
subject is, "Lying is not easily detectable by a psychiatrist. ' 227 One
team of researchers has noted the "complex difficulties facing the
clinician trying to separate fantasy from reality" in childrens' reports
of sexual abuse.228 Another has stated that despite every possible
follow-up by the clinician, the clinician "may still be left questioning
whether the reported events are reality." 229 Even a behavioral sci-
entist, who claims the existence of a syndrome regarding sexually
abused children, acknowledges that "a nagging uncertainty exists"
regarding a clinician's distinguishing fantasy from reality.23 0 These
insights show that behavioral scientists themselves recognize that
they have no particular expertise in evaluating the credibility of a
child sexual abuse complainant.
3. Admissibility Analysis
As was pointed out above, in practical terms there is often little
difference between an expert's diagnosis that a child has been sexu-
ally abused and an expert's opinion that the child is telling the
truth. 23' Thus, it should not be surprising that many aspects of the
admissibility analysis are identical with respect to the two types of
opinions.
Necessity: The first sub-inquiry is whether the subject matter of
the testimony-the veracity of the child complainant-is one which
the jury would benefit from expert assistance. The traditional an-
swer to this question would be "no," since it is commonly held that
one of the preeminent virtues of the jury is its ability to determine
the credibility of witnesses. One must recognize, however, that
child sexual abuse is a particularly mysterious phenomenon, often
involving an unusual cast of characters who are involved in relation-
225 See supra text accompanying notes 97-104.
226 See supra text accompanying notes 106-33.
227 Terr, The Child as Witness, in CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 207, 216 (D. Schetky
& E. Benedek ed. 1980). Presumably, lying is no more easily detectable by other behav-
ioral scientists, given that psychiatrists are the most exalted of behavioral scientists.
228 Rosenfeld, Nadelson & Krieger, supra note 119, at 159.
229 Id. at 314.
230 Summitt, supra note 17, at 189.
231 See supra text accompanying notes 225-26.
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ships that are seemingly inexplicable to most people. It seems rea-
sonable to suggest in these circumstances that there may often be
some need for expert assistance in determining who is likely to be
telling the truth.
As to the second sub-inquiry-whether the testimony is neces-
sary to counter irrational prejudices-the possible irrational
prejudices arising from the nature of the case still apply. The more
pertinent type of irrational prejudices here, however, stem from the
nature of the witnesses. Do jurors harbor irrational prejudices
against child witnesses, either because they are children, or because
an adult is offering contradictory testimony?
a. Do jurors harbor irrational prejudices against child witnesses
because they are children?
This question really involves two separate issues: first, do juries
tend to discount a witness' testimony because of the witness' young
age; and second, if they do, is that discounting irrational?
i) Do jurors tend to discount a witness' testimony because of the witness'
young age?
There have been only three significant studies dealing with this
issue. In one survey, several groups of people were asked to judge
the reliability of a hypothetical eight-year old's testimony. These
groups included potential citizen jurors, psychologists who research
eyewitness identification testimony, legal professionals, law students
and college students.2 32 Respondents were asked to indicate how
they thought an eight-year old child would answer questions by po-
lice or in court. Fewer than fifty percent of any group felt that the
child would respond accurately. Ninety-one percent of the re-
searchers and sixty-nine percent of the citizen jurors believed that
the child would either respond the way the questioner wished, or
would say "I don't know." 233  One team of researchers stated that
the fact that sixty-nine percent of the citizens felt that children
would not provide accurate testimony "indicates a general bias
against children's credibility as witnesses." 23 4 The other two signifi-
cant studies in the field are mock jury simulations, only one of which
supports this conclusion. In the earlier of the two studies members
of a mock jury were given information about a trial concerning a
232 Yarmey &Jones, Is the Psychology of Eyewitness Identification a Matter of Common Sense?,
in EVALUATING WITNESS EVIDENCE 13 (S. Lloyd & B. Clifford ed. 1983).
233 Id. at 35.
234 Goodman, Golding & Haith, supra note 202, at 142.
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vehicular homicide. All jurors received the same information about
the case except for the age of the key eyewitness. Some subjects
were led to believe that the eyewitness was six, others that he was
ten, and others that he was thirty. The respondents were then asked
to judge the credibility of the witness' testimony and the degree of
guilt to be attributed to the defendant. The results indicated that
the age of the witness had a powerful effect on the credibility rating.
Younger witnesses were perceived as less credible. 235 Despite this,
however, the jurors' assessment of the defendant's guilt did not vary
significantly depending upon the age of the key eyewitness. 236 The
researchers who conducted the study concluded that while the ju-
rors were substantially more skeptical concerning the child's credi-
bility than an adult's credibility, the jurors were willing to act on the
basis of the child's testimony as long as there was sufficient corrobo-
ration from other sources.237
The other jury simulation reached a diametrically opposite con-
clusion. 238 In that study, mock juries viewed a videotaped trial in
which a key prosecution witness was either an eight-year old boy or
a twenty-five year old man. The juries were significantly more likely
to return a guilty verdict on the basis of the young boy's eyewitness
recollections than on the basis of the twenty-five year old man's
recollections, even though the testimony was identical.2 39 On the
basis of the limited research conducted thus far it is unclear whether
jurors harbor a prejudice against child witnesses.
240
ii) Assuming that jurors tend to discount a young witness' testimony because
of his or her age, is that discounting irrational?
Even assuming that they do harbor such prejudice, the second
issue is whether that prejudice is "irrational." In order to know
whether the jurors' prejudices against child witness testimony are
irrational, it must first be determined exactly what makes jurors dis-
235 Id. at 148-151.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 151.
238 Ceci, Ross & Toglia, Suggestibility of Children's Memory: Psycho-Legal Implica-
tions (unpublished manuscript) (available at the Department of Health and Family Serv-
ices, Cornell University).
239 Id. at 41.
240 It should be noted that during the early part of this century, it was clear that both
courts and researchers harbored irrational prejudices against children as witnesses due
to their age. Schultz, The Victim and the Justice System-An Introdnction, in THE SEXUAL
VICTIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 171, 172 (L. Schultz ed. 1980); See also, Berliner & Barbieri, The
Testimony of the Child Iictim of SexialAssaidt, 40J. Soc. IssuEs 125, 127 (1984). The extent
to which the courts and researchers reflected the state of mind of the public cannot be
determined.
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trust children as witnesses. Then it must be determined whether
these bases of distrust are valid and therefore rational.
There has been no empirical research on the question of why
jurors may tend to distrust child witnesses. It is possible, however,
to suggest a list of commonsense reasons why jurors may tend to be
skeptical of child witnesses. 24 1 This list can be related to the four
basic requirements of witness competency: the moral ability to tell
the truth, and the mental abilities to correctly perceive, remember
and narrate.2
42
Moral ability to tell the truth: With respect to the moral ability to
tell the truth, jurors may believe that children are more likely to lie
than are adults. What little research has been done in this area
points to the conclusion that if this prejudice exists, it is irra-
tional.243 One commentator has suggested that while courts have
been particularly concerned with the ability of children to tell the
truth, that concern seems misplaced since, "[t]here is in fact little
correlation between age and honesty." 244 Indeed, police experi-
ence with child victims confirms the research experience in other
settings: "From 1969 to 1974, Michigan police referred to a poly-
graph examiner one hundred forty-seven children whose veracity
about allegations of sexual abuse was questioned. Only one child
was judged to be lying."
245
241 An intriguing discussion of the difference between the way lawyers and social
scientists approach a problem is found in Meehl, Law and the Fireside Inductions: Some
Reflections of a Clinical Psychologist, 27 J. Soc. ISSUES 65 (1971). The author, one of the
leading pioneers of modem clinical psychological research, suggests that the legal sys-
tem often relies on "fireside inductions" about human behavior, i.e. judgments based on
common sense, anecdotal introspection and cultural beliefs, while social scientists are
committed to judgments based on empirical research. Id. at 65. Both approaches have
problems. "Fireside inductions" are often untestable (or at least untested) and may
contain considerable sources of error. Id. Empirical research often has methodological
problems and is usually inconclusive. Id. One argument in favor of "fireside induc-
tions" is that given the difficulties of empirical research, even a rather obvious truth
based on the reality of human experience may be difficult to prove empirically. Skoler,
New Hearsay Exceptions for a Child's Statement of Sexual Abuse, 18J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 40
(1984). While this may be true, the problem with this approach is that the very judg-
ment that something is "a rather obvious truth" may itself be incorrect. For an example
of an induction that many people believe constitutes a rather obvious truth and which
empirical research is tending to show is not a truth at all, see the discussion of the effect
of polygraph evidence on jurors, supra note 213. The suggested list of reasons why ju-
rors may distrust child witnesss is an example of "fireside induction."
242 R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKERIED, & E. KIONKA, MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF EVIDENCE
109 (1983).
243 See Burton, Honesty and Dishonesty, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR: THE-
ORY, RESEARCH AND SOCIAL ISSUES (F. Lickona ed. 1976).
244 Melton, Bulkley & Wulkan, Competency of Children as Witnesses, in Child Sexual Abuse
and the Law 125, 136 (J. Bulkley ed., 2d ed. 1981)(footnotes omitted).
245 Id.
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Mental ability to perceive: With respect to a child's mental ability
to perceive, jurors may believe children are deficient in perceptive
abilities. Based on the little research that has been done in this area,
if such a prejudice exists, it probably is irrational. Research indi-
cates that it is not clear that children notice less. Indeed, "there is
some intriguing evidence that young children sometimes notice po-
tentially interesting things that older children and adults miss." 246
Additionally, perceptive abilities are usually questioned where the
child's perception is a fleeting impression of someone the child does
not know, such as in an eyewitness identification situation. Serious
questions concerning perceptual abilities would not seem to be im-
plicated in sexual abuse situations, where the contact with the
abuser is for a substantial duration, and the abuser is likely to be
someone known to the child.
Mental ability to remember: With respect to the mental ability of
children to correctly remember events, there are three possible rea-
sons why adults may tend to distrust a child's memory. The first is a
belief that children's memories are basically inferior to those of
adults. To the extent that adults hold this belief, at least in child
sexual abuse cases, it is probably irrational. While the research
states fairly clearly that "on memory tasks involving recall children
make more errors of omission than do adults," 247 it is also to be true
that a major reason for this difference is that children may not have
the relevant prior knowledge that would allow them to organize dis-
parate elements into a coherent whole or to relate one set of events
to another. When this knowledge advantage of adults is eliminated,
as when children are testifying about a situation with which they are
particularly familiar, the adults' knowledge advantage seems to be
eliminated. 248 The conclusion of the most recent research in this
area is that, "To the extent that children are asked to testify about
activities with which they are quite familiar, we might expect their
memories to be at least as good, and on occasion better, than those
of adults." 249 Particularly in child abuse cases, where the perpetra-
tor is often known to the child, and the abuse often continues over a
long period of time, there would not appear to be great reason to be
concerned that the child has forgotten important facts such as the
identity of the abuser or what occurred during the abuse.
246 Johnson & Foley, Differentiating Fact from Fantasy: The Reliability of Children s Memory,
40J. Soc. IssUEs 33, 35-36 (1984).
247 Id. at 34; Loftus & Davies, Distortions in the Memory of Children, 40J. Soc. IssuEs 51,
54 (1984).
248 Johnson & Foley, supra note 246, at 33-35.
249 Johnson & Foley, supra note 246, at 35.
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A second belief that adults may hold concerning why a child's
memory should be distrusted, is that children are unable to separate
remembered facts from remembered fantasies. Researchers in the
area of child sexual abuse believe that this is a particularly likely
prejudice for adults to hold. 250 A recent study in this area points to
the conclusion that if this prejudice exists, it is partly rational and
partly irrational, and that there is one important aspect which the
existing research does not even address. The researchers summa-
rized their findings as follows:
The belief is pervasive that children have more difficulty than adults in
discriminating what they perceive from what they imagine, but it has
little direct experimental support. Children in our studies did not ap-
pear to be more likely to confuse what they had imagined or done with
what they had perceived. On the other hand, young children did have
particular difficulty discriminating what they had done from what they
had only thought of doing.
2 51
The authors then go on to point out an important question not
covered by their research:
An important question, for both theory and for courtroom testimony,
is whether children only have difficulty with memories that involve
themselves as agents or whether the same pattern would be found with
another agent. Would children have the same difficulty separating
what they saw someone else do from what they only imagined that
person doing? We are currently investigating this question.
252
It should be noted that there is an age, ranging from eight253 to
twelve 254, after which researchers tend to believe that children have
no problem in separating fantasy from reality. It must be
remembered that many child sexual complainants are older than
these ages. Thus, with respect to children over a certain age, it
would seem to be irrational for jurors to believe that they cannot
separate fantasy from reality. With respect to younger children, it
would seem to be irrational for jurors to believe that children can-
not distinguish between a memory of something they have merely
perceived and something they have imagined or done, but it may
not be irrational to believe that young children have difficulty distin-
guishing between what they have done and what they have only
thought of doing. Furthermore, there is no basis for saying that it is
irrational for adults to believe that children may have the same diffi-
250 Johnson & Foley, supra note 246, at 34 (citing six studies from 1911 through 1981
which assumed that, "Compared to adults, children.., notice even less, forget faster,
and, especially .... [to] intermingle imagination with memory.'" (citations omitted)).
251 Johnson & Foley, supra note 246, at 45.
252 Johnson & Foley, supra note 246, at 45.
253 Rosenfeld, Nadelson & Krieger, supra note 119, at 161.
254 Id.
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culty separating what they saw someone else do from what they only
imagined that person doing.
The third belief that adults may have about a child's memory,
which may lead them to distrust it, is perhaps the most often men-
tioned: that children are particularly susceptible to suggestion. The
fear is that children will not be testifying from actual memories, but
from false memory implanted by an adult.255 An important fact to
be noted here is that recent research has revealed that adults are
much more susceptible to suggestion than has previously been be-
lieved. 256 Thus, the question is not whether children are suggesti-
ble, but whether they are more suggestible than adults. On the basis
of current research it is impossible to reach a conclusion on whether
the belief that children are more suggestible is irrational. At least
one study has concluded that children are no more susceptible to
suggestion than adults. 257 However, another study concluded that
children were substantially more ready to adopt the suggestion con-
tained in a leading question than were older persons. 258 And the
most recent study in the area concluded that very young children,
three- and four-year olds for instance, are highly susceptible to sug-
gestion.259 Thus, on the basis of the available behavioral scientific
research, it is impossible to state that adult prejudice over children's
susceptibility to suggestion is irrational.
Mental ability to narrate: One possible source of adult prejudice
with respect to the mental ability of children to accurately narrate
what they perceive and remember, is the heavy emphasis placed on
consistency of testimony. A child's testimony, may not be consistent
either because the child's perception of consistency is not the same
as an adult's or because children can be easily confused by leading
and/or complex questions on cross-examination. 260 There is no re-
search to suggest, however, that adults are not willing and able to
255 See Ceci, Ross & Toglia, supra note 238, at 3-4 (citing many studies asserting this
belief).
256 Loftus & Davies, supra note 247, at 56-57. These findings account in large part for
the recent trend allowing expert testimony on the issue of the fallibility of eyewitness
identifications. See, e.g., United States v. Downing; 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985); People
v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984).
257 See Duncan, Whitney & Kunen, Integration of Visual and Verbal Information in Children's
Memories, 53 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1215, 1221 (1982).
258 Cohen & Harnick, The Susceptibility of Child Witnesses to Suggestion, 4 L. AND HUM.
BEHAVIOR 201, 208-09 (1980). For a review of the conflicting research results, see Ceci,
Ross & Toglia supra note 238, at 5-10.
259 Ross & TOGLIA, supra note 238, at 5-10. This study did not focus on older chil-
dren, since the researchers felt that very young children may be the ones most suscepti-
ble to suggestion, and little research had been done regarding children of that age.
260 Goodman, Golding & Haith, supra note 202, at 144, 146-47.
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give children more latitude with respect to consistency than they
would to an adult witness. In any event, it is difficult to say that a
juror's prejudice against someone whose testimony is not consistent
is irrational.
Another possible prejudice associated with narration relates to
the general demeanor and conduct of a child witness, which is likely
to be more equivocal and less confident than that of an adult wit-
ness. Studies have demonstrated that certainty, confidence, and the
ability to answer questions in narrative form rather than with short
answers lend credibility to witness testimony.261 Children are less
likely to have these attributes as witnesses than are adults. Again,
however, it is difficult to say that jurors may not make allowances for
children on these counts, or that a juror's prejudice against a wit-
ness who is uncertain, lacks confidence, and who must respond with
short answers rather than narrative answers, is irrational.
In reviewing this discussion of possible juror prejudices against
child witnesses, three factors should be highlighted. First, the exist-
ence and extent of these prejudices is, in most cases, based on
guesswork. Second, meaningful behavioral scientific research in this
area is in the embryonic stages. 262 Thus all of the findings men-
tioned above should be treated as tentative and it should be recog-
nized that much more research on all of them is necessary before
any certain conclusions can be put forth. 263 Third, it is important to
remember that if expert testimony is deemed necessary to overcome
irrational prejudices, testimony by which the expert vouches for the
particular complainant's credibility is not the only alternative.
There also exists the alternative of general testimony concerning
the capabilities of child witnesses. This general testimony has the
virtue, even if believed, of not being dispositive or virtually disposi-
tive of the case and therefore it would require a lesser degree of
necessity and reliability.
b. Do jurors tend to irrationally discount a child's testimony
when it is contradicted by an adult's testimony?
Even assuming that jurors do not harbor irrational prejudices
261 GOODMAN, GOLDING & HAr-, supra note 202, at 144-45.
262 40J. Soc. IssuEs is entirely devoted to the subject of child testimony. The coordi-
nator of the issue wrote that it "represents perhaps the first attempt to provide a com-
prehensive, book-length treatment of psychological research, laws, and legal practices
concerning child witnesses." Goodman, The Child Witness: An Introduction, 40J. Soc. Is-
SUES 1, 2 (1984).
263 For suggestions concerning the numerous areas in which research is necessary, see
Goodman, supra note 262, at 157.
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against children because of their age, it is possible that they may too
readily discount a child's testimony if contradicted by an adult's tes-
timony. There has been absolutely no behavioral scientific research
to test whether this phenomenon occurs. If it does occur, it may be
rational or irrational depending upon what bases the jurors have for
crediting the adult at the expense of the child.
In summary, there may be some necessity for expert testimony
due to certain irrational prejudices on the part of jurors.
Understandability: With respect to understandability of an ex-
pert's testimony that the child is telling the truth, the analysis does
not differ significantly from the analysis of this factor regarding ex-
pert testimony diagnosing a child as sexually abused. 264 The fact
that such subject matter would not be far removed from the under-
standing of a common juror and the fact that it can be expressed
with clarity and simplicity cut in favor of understandability. On the
other hand, the availability of experts for the opponent to use to put
the testimony into perspective and the practical availability of the
arcane, specialized literature are problematic. With respect to
whether such testimony would tend to overwhelm the jury, although
its "software" nature would have a tendency not to do so, it is possi-
ble that the jury could simply accede to the expert's conclusion if
the expert is not tested by searching cross-examination or opposed
by the testimony of another expert.
Importance: The testimony of an expert stating that the com-
plainant is telling the truth rates even higher on the scale of impor-
tance than does testimony of an expert stating that the child has
been sexually abused. This is true because whereas a diagnosis of
sexual abuse speaks directly to only one of the major issues in the
case-whether the child has been sexually abused-expert testi-
mony asserting that the child is telling the truth goes directly to
both of the major issues in the case. It is proof not only on the issue
of whether the abuse occurred, but also on the issue of whether the
identity of the abuser can be determined. If believed, it is com-
pletely dispositive of the case.
Balancing: Having analyzed all four factors it is still necessary to
balance them to determine whether an expert's opinion on the ve-
racity of the complainant's testimony should be admissible. It seems
that the result here should be the same as the result with respect to
expert diagnosis of child sexual abuse, for the same reason: the tes-
timony should not be admitted because the importance of the testi-
mony is very high while the reliability of the testimony is very low.
264 See supra text accompanying notes 211-13.
[Vol. 77
1986] ADMISSIBILITY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 53
The necessity and understandability factors do not cut clearly
enough in favor of admission to outweigh the unreliability of the
testimony. Accordingly, the majority of courts which have held such
testimony to be inadmissible are correct.
B. BY AN OPINION THAT IT IS RARE FOR A CHILD TO FABRICATE OR
FANTASIZE A CLAIM OF SEXUAL ABUSE.
1. Case Law
Expert opinions that it is rare for children to fabricate or
fantasize claims of sexual abuse are the second way in which experts
have been used to vouch for a complainant's credibility.265 This tes-
timony vouches for the complainant's credibility because it con-
cludes that the complainant is almost certainly telling the truth.
Two courts have held with very little meaningful discussion that
such testimony was properly admitted.266 In one case the court sim-
ply noted that testimony in the form of an opinion is not objectiona-
ble merely because it embraces an ultimate issue, that the testimony
was especially appropriate in view of the defense counsel's cross-
examination attack upon the victim's character for truthfulness, and
that the trend in Colorado law was to allow expert testimony regard-
ing the capacity of children to fabricate claims of sexual abuse.267 In
the other case, the court simply noted that the expert's qualifica-
tions put him in a position superior to the jury to determine whether
265 The terms "fabricate" and "fantasize" have not been differentiated by the courts.
Presumably, "fabricate" implies an intentional untruth, while "fantasize" implies an un-
truth that is not willful, but rather is the product of an overactive imagination which the
child truthfully cannot thereafter distinguish from reality.
266 In two other cases the testimony has been held to have been properly admitted,
but only for reasons peculiar to the cases. In State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn.
1984), the expert testified that it was rare for children to fabricate tales of sexual abuse,
and that she believed the complainant. Without focusing on the rarity of testimony, the
court held that the opinion concerning the complainant's truthfulness had been prop-
erly admitted because the defense had opened the door by seeking to establish that the
complainant's mother had not believed her for a long time. Id. at 611-12. See supra note
217 for a more detailed discussion of this holding. The second case is also one where
the defense "opened the door." In State v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287, 290-92, 667 P.2d
96, 97-98 (1983), it was held that the defense opened the door to similar testimony by
asking the question, "Have you ever known any children who have lied?"
Also of interest is the case of W.C.L. v. People, 685 P.2d 176 (Colo. 1984), where
the court indicated that if the Colorado rules of evidence had contained a residual hear-
say exception, the court would have ruled, on the basis of expert testimony that it was
rare for children to fabricate claims of sexual abuse, that the preliminary facts necessary
to establish the reliability of a hearsay declaration by the complainant regarding the
alleged abuse would have been established. Id. at 182-83. This case does not speak to
the admissibility of the expert opinion, since under CoLo. R. EVID. 104(a), the court was
not bound by rules of admissibility in determining a preliminary fact.
267 People v. Ashley, 687 P.2d 473, 475 (Colo. App. 1984).
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or not a child would fantasize concerning sexual abuse.268
There have thus far been no cases holding the substance of
such testimony to be inadmissible, although there has been one case
in which the testimony has been held to have been improperly ad-
mitted for a procedural reason, namely, that the credibility of the
complainant had not been sufficiently attacked to allow such
bolstering.
269
2. Behavioral Scientific Research
It has already been pointed out that despite the fact that there
has been very little empirical research concerning the extent to
which children lie or fantasize in making claims of sexual abuse, and
the fact that it is difficult to see how such empirical research could
be conducted, the feeling in the scientific community that deals with
sexually abused children is that it is indeed rare for this to hap-
pen. 2 70 It has further been pointed out that as a matter of common
sense, this feeling is probably correct, since there is little reason to
doubt that most reports of all kinds of crime are legitimate and
there is no reason to suspect any higher percentage of false reports
with respect to child sexual abuse. 27 1 There has been a recognition
in behavioral scientific literature that false reports can happen and
discussions of reasons they might happen, but none of the discus-
sions indicates the author's belief that false reports are anything
other than isolated occurrences. 272 Thus, although empirical re-
search cannot be cited in support of the conclusion, it seems fair to
say that as a matter of experience among practitioners in the field
and on the basis of common sense, behavioral scientists support the
validity of the proposition that it is rare for children to fabricate or
fantasize claims of sexual abuse.
3. Admissibility Analysis
Necessity: The necessity factor has already been analyzed in-
268 State v. Raye, 73 N.C. App. 273, 326 S.E.2d 333, 335, review denied, 313 N.C. 609,
332 S.E.2d 183 (1985).
269 Farris v. State, 643 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
270 See supra text accompanying notes 208-10. See also, Berliner & Barbieri, supra note
240, at 127.
271 See supra text accompanying notes 208-10.
272 See Mrazek, The Child Psychiatric Examination of the Sexually Abused Child, in SEXUALLY
ABUSED CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 143, 151 (P. Mrazek & C. Kempe ed. 1981); THE
SEXUAL VIcrIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 22 (L. Schultz ed. 1980); Brant & Tisza, supra note 17, at
82; Goodwin, Sahd, & Rada, supra note 210, at 269-70; Nadelson & Rosenfeld, supra note
132, at 104; Rosenfeld, Nadelson & Krieger, supra note 119, at 159; Weiss, Incest Accusa-
tion: Assessing Credibility, 1983 J. OF PSYCHIATRY AND L. 307, 307-08.
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depth, and the same analyses are applicable with respect to this kind
of expert testimony.273 It is sufficient to note that there may well be
a necessity for the testimony because it would assist the jury to know
what percentage of sexual abuse complainants are truthful, and be-
cause it may be necessary to counter irrational prejudices of the
jury, to counter points made by the opponent, or to counter jury
instructions. Again, however, there do exist alternative forms of ex-
pert testimony to fulfill this necessity.
274
Reliability: The first sub-inquiry is whether it is generally ac-
cepted by the scientific community dealing with sexually abused
children that false reports are rare. It has been pointed out above
that this conclusion does have general acceptance. 275 As to the sec-
ond sub-inquiry-the error rate-it is not even applicable because
there is no diagnosis regarding a particular complainant that can be
deemed erroneous.
Understandability: The testimony scores well with respect to the
first four sub-inquiries: the subject matter is not far removed from
the common experience of the jury, the conclusion can be explained
with clarity and simplicity, the availability of other experts seems im-
material since it would probably be impossible to find a reputable
expert who would contradict the conclusion, and the availability of
specialized literature would also not lead to any significant contra-
diction because there is no indication in the literature that such re-
ports are anything other than rare. However, the fifth sub-inquiry-
whether the evidence would have a tendency to overwhelm the
jury-presents a substantial problem.
The problem is that such testimony invites the jury to convict
the defendant on the basis of a statistical probability rather than on
the basis of the evidence in the case. 276 Commentators have been
virtually unanimous in their condemnation of the use of probability
evidence on crucial points in criminal prosecutions. 277 Even com-
273 See supra text accompanying notes 192-206 and 227-63.
274 See supra text accompanying notes 204-06 and 263-64. See also, infra text accompa-
nying notes 296-326.
275 See supra text accompanying notes 270-72.
276 Although testimony that it is "rare" for a child sexual abuse complainant to
fantasize or fabricate is not explicitly statistical, as a practical matter it seems to be no
different in impact from statistical testimony, such as that ninety-nine percent of child
sexual abuse complaints are true.
277 L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977); Dickson, Medical Causation By
Statistics, FORUM 792, 801; Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Accept-
ability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1379 (1985); Tribe, Trial By Mathmatics: Preci-
sion and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1974); Statistics in the Lanw:
Potential Problems in the Presentation of Statistical Evidence, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 313
(1983)
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mentators who urge greater use of probability evidence in civil
cases278 agree that probability evidence is not appropriate in crimi-
nal cases. 279 There are four interrelated reasons that lead to this
conclusion.
First, there is a basic incompatibility between the reasonable
doubt standard and probability analysis. Although accuracy of ver-
dicts is desirable in criminal cases as well as in other cases, there are
deep societal values other than accuracy that must be vindicated
through the criminal process. 280 These values include fairness, the
appearance of fairness, and not convicting innocent people.
Probability analysis is simply unable to quantify the concept of rea-
sonable doubt.281 In very basic terms, a probability less than one
282
does not speak directly to the question of whether the particular de-
fendant on trial committed the crime in question.283 Finally, this
type of evidence suggests a concept incompatible with traditional
notions of reasonable doubt: that a fixed rate of error is acceptable
in criminal proceedings. 284
The second reason why probability evidence is inappropriate
on a key issue in a criminal case is the "overbearing impressiveness"
278 Brook, The Use of Statistical Evidence of Identification in Civil Litigation: Well-Worn Hy-
potheticals, Real Cases, and Controversy, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 293 (1985); Tyree, Probability
Theory and the Law of Evidence, 8 CRIM. L.J. 224 (1984). Some recent commentators do
not even countenance greater use of probability evidence in civil cases. See Jaffee, Of
Probativity and Probability: Statistics, Scientific Evidence, and the Calculus of Chance at Trial, 46
U. Pirr. L. REv. 925 (1985).
279 Brook, supra note 278, at 309-10; Tyree, supra note 278, at 233.
280 Brook, supra note 278, at 309-3 10.
281 Tyree, supra note 278, at 233.
282 There does exist at least one type of "probability" evidence which is accepted as
having a probability of one: fingerprint comparison. This type of evidence is not even
considered to be "probability" evidence.
283 People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968); Brook,
supra note 278, at 320; Tribe, supra note 277, at 1355.
284 Tribe, supra note 277, at 1374; Tyree, supra note 278, at 233. For example, the
reasoning is that if testimony is presented in one hundred child sexual abuse cases that
ninety-nine percent of complainants tell the truth, the juries in all one hundred cases
could convict on the basis of the probability, even though the probability is that one of
the accusations was false. Thus, the evidence implies that an error rate of one percent is
acceptable. While undoubtedly erroneous guilty verdicts occur in criminal cases:
[S]uch unavoidable errors are in no sense intended, and the fact that they must occur
if trials are to be conducted at all need not undermine the effort, through the sym-
bols of trial procedure, to express society's fundamental commitment to the protec-
tion of the defendant's rights as a person, as an end in himself. On the other hand,
formulating an "acceptable" risk of error to which the trier is willing deliberately to
subject the defendant would interfere seriously with this expressive role of the de-
mand for certitude-however unattainable real certitude may be, and however
clearly all may ultimately recognize its unattainability.
Tribe, supra note 277, at 1374 (emphasis in original)(footnote omitted).
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of numbers.28 5 A jury is likely to simply be bowled over by a
number demonstrating an alleged high probability that the defend-
ant committed the crime.
286
A third reason why probability evidence is inappropriate is that
in most human situations there exist factors which simply cannot be
quantified. The syndrome has been expressed as, "If you can't
count it, it doesn't exist."287 Thus,
[r]eadily quantifiable factors are easier to process-and hence more
likely to be recognized and then reflected in the outcome-than are
factors that resist ready quantification. The result, despite what turns
out to be a spurious appearance of accuracy and completeness, is likely
to be significantly warped and hence highly suspect.
288
The fourth reason that probability evidence is inappropriate on
a key issue in a criminal case is that the very nature of the evidence
makes it difficult, if not impossible, for most jurors to deal with it
rationally. 289 For one thing, a helpful understanding of what
probabilities do and do not prove may well be beyond the capacity
of mostjurors. 2 90 Numbers may appear to be more irrefutable than
other types of evidence, and thus less susceptible to attack by cross-
examination and opposing experts. 291 Indeed, there is a real possi-
bility that an understanding of probabilities thorough enough to
permit an effective cross-examination may be beyond the ability of
many lawyers. 292 Further, asking jurors to compare probability evi-
dence with other evidence may be asking them to compare apples
with oranges. In order to deal with all apples or all oranges, the
jury would have to figure out a way to either translate the
probability figure into the subjective mode in which they usually rea-
son, or figure out a way to translate the subjective mode in which
they usually reason into probabilities. There is no reason to suspect
that jurors can perform such mental gymnastics. 29 3 The jury may
see its role as becoming "mechanical and automatic" so that the jury
285 Tribe, supra note 277, at 1361.
286 Collins, 68 Cal. 2d at 320, 438 P.2d at 34, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968); Brook, supra
note 278, at 308; Tribe, supra note 277, at 1355; Statistics in the Law: Potential Pr-oblems in
the Presentation of Statistical Evidence, supra note 277, at 334.
287 Tribe, supra note 277, at 1361.
288 Id. at 1362.
289 This is perhaps merely a more detailed analysis of why numbers are overbearingly
oppressive, see supra text accompanying note 285-86.
290 Dickson, supra note 277, at 796; Tribe, supra note 277, at 1355.
291 Dickson, supra note 277, at 801; Statistics in the Law: Potential Problems in the Presenta-
tion of Statistical Evidence, supra note 277, at 338.
292 Statistics in the Law: Potential Problems in the Presentation of Statistical Evidence, supra
note 277.
293 Dickson, supra note 277, at 800.
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abdicates the humanizing influence it can have on the law through
the use of its intuition and sense of community values.294 For all of
these reasons probability evidence may overwhelm the jury to the
extent that it attributes more probative value to the evidence than it
actually has. This constitutes "unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury ... "295
Importance: Evidence that it is rare for a child to fantasize or
fabricate a claim of sexual abuse speaks directly to both of the major
issues in a child sexual abuse case: whether the abuse occurred, and
whether the defendant was the perpetrator.
Balancing: The balancing test with respect to this type of expert
opinion leads to the conclusion that it should not be admissible.
The reliability factor clearly favors admission of the evidence. This
factor is outweighed, however, by the extreme potential the evi-
dence has to overwhelm the jury on the two dispositive issues in the
case. The necessity factor is not clear-cut enough in favor of admis-
sion to tip the balance in favor of admissibility. Indeed, even if the
necessity were clearer, it does not seem that it should tip the balance
in favor of admissibility where the evidence may mislead the jury on
the key issues in the case. Accordingly, the courts which have sanc-
tioned the admission of such testimony are in error.
IV. THE USE OF AN EXPERT'S EXPLANATORY TESTIMONY TO
ENHANCE THE COMPLAINANT'S CREDIBILITY BY EXPLAINING
THE COMPLAINANT'S "UNUSUAL" BEHAVIOR
The preceding section of this article examined the use of expert
opinions to vouch for a complainant's credibility. The focus of this
section is on expert opinion testimony offered to enhance the com-
plainant's credibility by explaining the complainant's unusual be-
havior. Enhancing testimony does not constitute an expert's
vouching for the complainant's credibility because it does not in-
volve a direct opinion by the expert about the veracity of the partic-
ular complainant. Rather, the testimony is of a general nature
designed to explain why behavior by the complainant that might ap-
pear on its face to be unusual behavior by the complainant may not
in fact be unusual.
A. CASE LAW
The invariable pattern at trial where enhancing testimony is
sought to be introduced is that the defendant, usually by cross-ex-
294 Tribe, supra note 277, at 1376.
295 FED. R. EvID. 403.
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amination of the complainant, seeks to highlight some unusual as-
pect of her behavior. The prosecution then offers an expert in
rebuttal to explain the unusual behavior.
The most common type of unusual behavior that the defendant
seeks to highlight is delay by the child in reporting the abuse. From
this fact of delay, the defense will argue the implication that a child
who had really been sexually abused would have immediately re-
ported the abuse and that because this complainant did not, it is
likely that the report is untrue. Courts have unanimously upheld
the admissibility of expert testimony introduced by the prosecution
to take the steam out of this argument by explaining that often out
of confusion, fear and ambiguous feelings about the abuser, chil-
dren delay substantial periods of time in reporting the abuse, many
times not reporting it until they reach puberty. 296 The courts have
been very cryptic, however, in enunciating the reasoning supporting
their conclusions. For one court it was enough that the knowledge
was beyond the common experience of thejury.297 For two others it
was enough that the testimony would be useful to the jury in assess-
ing the complainant's credibility. 298 Another court dealt with the
issue simply by noting that it would not find that the trial judge had
abused his discretion in finding that the evidence would assist the
jury.299 A court in a later case in that jurisdiction simply followed
this precedent. 300
The second most popular type of unusual behavior that defend-
ants seek to exploit is that after the complainant made the sexual
abuse allegation, she retracted it, while now at trial she is attempting
to retract the recantation and reaffirm the original allegation. Thus,
the complainant is impeached by means of a prior inconsistent state-
ment. In rebuttal the prosecution offers an expert to explain that
296 E.g., People v. Dunnahoo, 152 Cal. App. 3d 561, 577, 199 Cal. Rptr. 796, 804
(1984); Smith v. State, 100 Nev. 570, 572, 688 P.2d 326, 327 (1984); People v. Benjamin
R., 103 A.D.2d 663, 669, 481 N.Y.S.2d 827, 832 (1984); Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 348
Pa. Super. 368, 377-78, 502 A.2d 253, 258 (1985); State.v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566,
576, 683 P.2d 173, 180 (1984); State v. Claflin, 38 Wash. App. 843, 852, 690 P.2d 1186,
1190 (1984). Testimony to explain various kinds of unusual behavior has also been
allowed in adult rape cases. See McCord, supra note 47, at 1177-78.
297 Dunnahoo, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 577, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
298 Smith, 100 Nev. at 572, 688 P.2d at 327; Benjamin R., 103 A.D.2d at 669, 481 N.Y.S.
2d at 832.
299 Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d at 576, 683 P.2d at 180.
300 Claflin, 38 Wash. App. at 852, 690 P.2d at 1190. Note, however, that the court
reversed in this case because the expert went on to testify that forty-three percent of
cases of sexual abuse, in her experience, were committed by father figures. The defend-
ant was a father figure, and the court held that this testimony that the defendant was
statistically likely to have committed the crime, was error. Id.
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because of fear, confusion and ambivalent feelings, it is not at all
unusual for a child to retract an allegation of abuse, particularly
when the alleged abuser is a family member. Two courts have up-
held the admissibility of such expert testimony301 and two other
courts have indicated in dicta that such testimony is admissible.
302
Again, the reasoning of the courts is not illuminating. One court
held that because such conduct was beyond the ordinary experience
of the jurors and because it would help the jury assess the witness'
credibility, it was properly admitted.303 Two other courts reached
their conclusions on the basis of precedent.30 4 The last court
reached its conclusion on the basis of the erroneous reasoning that
recantation was a component of adult rape trauma syndrome.
305
In summary, in no reported case has explanatory testimony of
unusual behavior been found to be inadmissible. The rationales
supporting the holdings of the courts which have admitted such tes-
timony have been, however, far from clear.
B. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
With respect to the contention that it is not unusual for children
to delay in reporting sexual abuse, although there has been no em-
pirical research done to determine in what percentage of reported
cases delay has occurred, it is fair to say that there is a shared feeling
among experts in the field that delay is not unusual.30 6 Beyond this
general feeling, two pieces of empirical data, when viewed together,
lead to the conclusion that delay in reporting is not uncommon.
First, a substantial portion of child sexual abuse cases involve abuse
that continues over a long period of time.30 7 Second, most children
301 People v. Reid, 123 Misc. 2d 1084, 1087, 475 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (1984); State v.
Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 436, 657 P.2d 1215, 1220 (1983).
302 People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1099, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45, 49 (1985); State
v. Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d 92, 97, 352 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
303 Middleton, 294 Or. at 436, 657 P.2d at 1220.
304 Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1099, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 49; Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d at 97,
352 N.W.2d at 676.
305 Reid, 123 Misc. 2d at 1087, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 743. On one hand, there is no support
in rape trauma syndrome research for the proposition that adult victims recant; on the
other hand, rape trauma syndrome does not include sexual abuse within its ambit.
Thus, the court was wrong both coming and going.
Other unusual complainant behavior that courts have allowed experts to explain
include that it is not unusual for a sexually abused girl to act seductively toward adult
males, People v. Vollentine, 643 P.2d 800, 803 (Colo. App. 1982), and that it is not
unusual for children to perceive that sexual acts occurred during sleep. State v. Har-
wood, 45 Or. App. 931, 609 P.2d 1312 (1980).
306 See, e.g., Summitt, supra note 17, at 186.
307 D. FINKELHOR, supra note 10, at 39 found that about forty percent of experiences
occur more than once, and about forty percent last more than one week, meaning that:
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never report the abuse, leading to the conclusion that there is often
reluctance to report at all. 308 Given this reluctance to report and
the fact that many relationships involving sexual abuse are endur-
ing, it would not be surprising to find a substantial number of cases
where long-term abuse was eventually reported. Further, research-
ers generally attribute delay or nonreporting to the same factors:
fear, confusion and ambivalent feelings.30 9 Accordingly, child sex-
ual abuse experts accept as true the proposition that it is not unu-
sual for a child to delay in reporting sexual abuse.
With respect to the assertion that it is not unusual for a child to
recant an allegation of sexual abuse, particularly an allegation
against a family member, while there is again no empirical research
concerning how often such recantations occur, it is fair to say that it
is generally believed by child abuse experts that recantations are not
unusual. 310 One author has gone so far as to state that recantation
is so common that it is an integral part of something he terms the
"child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. ' ' 31 '
Behavioral scientific research supports the validity of opinions
that delay in reporting and recantation, although unusual behaviors
at first glance, are in fact not unusual at all in the unnatural context
of child sexual abuse.
C. ADMISSIBILITY ANALYSIS
Necessity: Several bases of necessity related to the nature of the
cases and the nature of the witnesses have already been discussed
and are also pertinent here.312 However, one particular necessity
factor looms large in this situation: necessity because of actions
taken by the defendant. This necessity weighs heavily in favor of
"In other words, if the experience happens more than once, it usually goes on for longer
than a week. The long relationships usually continue for a long time, which is illustrated
by the fact that the average duration of relationships for girls is thirty-one weeks." Id.
(emphasis in original).
308 D. FINKELHOR, supra note 3, at 233; D. FINKELHOR, supra note 10, at 67.
309 D. FINKELHOR, supra note 3, at 232-33; Summitt, supra note 17, at 186.
310 V. DEFRANCIS, PROTECTING THE CHILD VICTIMS OF SEX CRIMES COMMrrrED BY
ADULTS (1969); Goodwin, Sahd, & Rada, supra note 210, at 272; Nakashima & Zakus,
Incest: Review and Clinical Experience, 60 PEDIATRICS 696 (1977).
311 Summitt, supra note 17, at 181, 188. This author undoubtedly goes overboard
when he states categorically, "Whatever a child says about sexual abuse, she is likely to reverse
it." Id. at 188 (emphasis added). There is no evidence that a preponderance of children
recant. If such a remarkable fact were true, one would expect to find some strong indi-
cations of it in the literature. Such indications do not exist. On the other hand, there
are indications that recantation is far from unusual. One article suggests that recanta-
tion may occur in thirty percent of cases. Goodwin, Sahd, & Rada, supra note 210, at
272.
312 See supra text accompanying notes 192-206 and 227-63.
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admission of explanatory testimony. As a matter of basic fairness, it
does not seem unfair to allow such testimony against a defendant
who has in a very real sense "brought it on himself" by attempting
to highlight alleged defects in the witness' testimony. What does
seem unfair is to allow an impeachment of the complainant based on
a prior inconsistent statement to carry more weight than it may de-
serve. Particularly with recantation testimony, where the prior in-
consistent statement is the most obvious, it seems likely that a jury
would see that as a major defect in the complainant's testimony.
While as a general rule expert testimony is not allowed to explain
why a witness made a prior inconsistent statement, in most cases
where a witness makes inconsistent statements there does not exist a
recognized phenomenon that could account for the inconsistency.
But in the peculiar context of child sexual abuse, there is a recog-
nized phenomenon of recantation. It seems unfair to allow the pow-
erful impeachment evidence to remain unrebutted when there exists
a plausible reason why the jury should not give the impeachment
the same weight as most prior inconsistent statements.
The case for allowing expert testimony to explain delay in re-
porting the abuse is not quite as strong, since there is no explicit
prior inconsistent statement. More subtly, however, prior inconsis-
tent statement impeachment is also at work here. Most authorities
recognize that impeachment by prior inconsistent statement in-
cludes the situation where the cross-examiner tries to demonstrate
"a failure to assert a fact it would have been natural to affirm" as
constituting "an assertion of the non-existence of the fact which can
be used to impeach testimony in which the witness admitted the
fact's existence." 313 The "inconsistent" inference that the defend-
ant seeks to establish-that because the complainant did not report
the abuse earlier it did not happen-is likely to make a substantial
impression on the jury314 and should not be allowed to go unrebut-
ted when there exists a recognized phenomenon which may explain
it.
Reliability: Opinions by experts that delay in reporting abuse,
recantation, and seductive behavior by a complainant are "not unu-
sual" are clearly generally accepted and reliable. This type of gen-
eral testimony should be contrasted with specific testimony such as
diagnosing a particular child as sexually abused or identifying a par-
ticular child as truthful. These very specific determinations require
313 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 151, at 607[06], and authorities cited
therein.
314 See supra text accompanying notes 312-13.
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precision. Analogous testimony with respect to recantation testi-
mony would be an opinion by an expert that the complainant in the
case had recanted not because the allegation was untrue but because
of fear, confusion and ambivalent feelings. Such a particularized
opinion would not be demonstrably reliable. However, general tes-
timony that such behavior is "not unusual" is reliable.
Understandability: The testimony is not far removed from the
common experience of the jury and is clear and simple. With re-
spect to the availability of other experts in specialized literature to
put the testimony into perspective, it is unlikely that they will be
available, but it is also unlikely that any respectable expert or writer
would disagree with the general statements that recantation, delay
in reporting and seductive behavior by a complainant are not unu-
sual. With respect to whether the evidence would have a tendency
to overwhelm the jury, this kind of testimony is clearly distinguish-
able from testimony that it is "rare" for a child to fantasize or fabri-
cate concerning sexual abuse. The latter type of testimony,
although reliable, should be inadmissible because of its tendency by
virtue of its probabilistic nature to overwhelm the jury on the key
issues.31 5 Testimony that something is "not unusual" does not have
the same aura of statistical authority. 31 6 In fact, the assertion that
something is "not unusual" implies that it occurs substantially less
than half the time. The jury can easily deal with such evidence with-
out the raising spectre of conviction on the basis of probability.
Importance: The testimony, if believed, is not dispositive or vir-
tually dispositive of the case. The evidence simply constitutes one
fact that the jurors can use in assessing the complainant's credibility,
and thus in deciding whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty.
The jury would be compelled to examine the other facts in the case
to see whether the crime was proven. Accordingly, while the testi-
mony is important in the sense that it goes to the complainant's
credibility, which is a key issue in the case, it is not dispositive.
Balancing: Balancing the factors explained above, it seems clear
that this type of testimony should be admitted. The necessity for it
is high, due to the fact that the opponent seeks to highlight the
weakness in the complainant's testimony, and because the highlight-
ing is likely to have the desired impact on the jury if an explanation
315 See supra text accompanying notes 276-95.
316 If, on the other hand, the testimony was that it is "rare" for a recantation to be
true, the same probability problems would arise, although perhaps not to the same de-
gree, since the validity of the recantation is one step removed from the validity of the
original accusation. It is not inconceivable that there are child abuse experts who would
be willing to testify that true recantations are rare. See Summitt, supra note 17.
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is not provided. The testimony is reliable and understandable. Fi-
nally, while the testimony is important, it is not, if believed, disposi-
tive or virtually dispositive of the case. Accordingly, the courts
which approved the admission of such testimony were correct, even
though they were not able to convincingly explain the reasons for
their holdings.
3 17
V. THE USE OF AN EXPERT'S EXPLANATORY TESTIMONY TO
ENHANCE THE COMPLAINANT'S CREDIBILITY BY EXPLAINING
THE CAPABILITIES OF CHILD WITNESSES-A
RELATIVELY UNEXPLORED POSSIBILITY
Thus far it seems that prosecutors have made very little use of
expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases to explain the capabili-
ties of child witnesses. Two possible forms of testimony exist.
The first possibility is testimony regarding the capacities of the
particular complainant which stops short of vouching for the com-
plainant's credibility. The distinction between enhancing and
vouching here would be that the enhancing testimony would focus
on the ability of this particular complainant to testify accurately, not
on whether the complainant was actually testifying accurately. Testi-
mony of this nature has been approved in one case, where it was
held that an opinion concerning the complainant's "reality testing,"
that is, her ability to "differentiate what is real from what isn't real"
was properly admitted.318 In another case it was held to be an error
317 It was noted by this author with respect to rape trauma syndrome testimony that
courts which subjected the testimony to searching inquiries regarding relevance, unfair
prejudice, compliance with the Frye rule, etc. when it was offered in the case-in-chief to
prove that the crime occurred, often, without explanation, treated the testimony much
more leniently when it was offered in rebuttal to explain the unusual behavior of the
complainant. McCord, supra note 47, at 1183-84. Thus, a court that held the testimony
inadmissible as not generally accepted when offered in the case-in-chief could, in virtu-
ally the same breath, approve the use of similar testimony in rebuttal without even in-
quiring about general acceptance. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 298,
301, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984). The four-factor balancing analysis proposed in this
article provides a reasoned basis why testimony may appropriately be treated differently
in the case-in-chief and in rebuttal, i.e., the necessity, reliability, understandability and
importance factors may balance differently. This analysis would have proven helpful to
the court in People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1983), where
the court tried to divine the meaning of the seemingly contradictory signals in Bledsoe.
The Roscoe court correctly perceived that Bledsoe seemed to require general testimony
rather than a particularized diagnosis, but seemed unable to explain why Bledsoe reached
that result. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. at 1099-1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50 An Oregon
court in Munro, 68 Or. App. 63, 680 P.2d 708 arrived at a similar perception regarding
State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983), but was similarly unable to ex-
plain the reason behind the precedent. State v. Munro, 68 Or. App. 63, 66, 680 P.2d
708, 710 (1984).
318 Commonwealth v. Carter, 383 Mass. 873, 417 N.E.2d 439 (1981).
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to exclude expert opinion testimony offered by a defendant to show
that the complainant had a defective memory, limited verbal ability
and could only understand simple questions. 319 On the other hand,
one court held that admitting testimony that the complainants were
able to distinguish fantasy from reality and truth from falsehood was
error because it improperly bolstered the complainants' credibility
and usurped the jury's function. 320 Another court held that expert
opinion testimony that the complainant was suffering from an emo-
tional disturbance that rendered her ability to perceive and tell the
truth suspect, was properly excluded as an improper comment on
the credibility of the witness. 321
The admissibility analysis of testimony concerning the capabili-
ties of a particular complainant is likely to lead to varying results
depending on what abilities are the subject of the testimony. The
necessity factor is likely to be high with respect to most subjects,
either because the defendant is seeking to highlight a certain alleged
defect in the witness or because the child is very young and likely to
be the most suspect in the eyes of the jury. The level of reliability of
the expert's opinion will vary, however, depending upon the ab-
stractness of the conclusion reached by the expert. For example, an
expert's testimony regarding "reality testing," which is an aspect of
sanity, is likely to be suspect since there exists convincing literature
to the effect that behavioral scientists are notoriously unable to ac-
curately diagnose complex issues such as sanity.3 22 On the other
hand, if the expert is testifying to a concrete conclusion, such as the
verbal abilities of the complainant, the testimony may be quite relia-
319 State v. Roberts, 139 Ariz. 117, 124, 677 P.2d 280, 287 (1983).
320 United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1985). The majority was per-
suasively taken to task by Judge Wallace for equating an opinion concerning the ability to
tell the truth with an opinion concerning truthfulness:
In this case, the experts testified only that the children were capable of telling the
truth-they did not opine as to whether or not the children actually had done so. The
difference between knowing a witness can tell the truth and concluding that he did
not do so is fundamental. Thus, the jury was free to believe or disbelieve the chil-
dren's testimony, and in my judgment, the expert testimony neither helped nor hin-
dered that determination.
Id. at 605 (Wallace, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
321 Munro, 68 Or. App. at 66-67, 680 P.2d at 710. It should be noted that in all three
of these cases the complainant was not only a child, but also was mildly retarded. Since
the effect of retardation on the witness' capabilities is probably a separate basis for al-
lowing expert testimony, it cannot be determined whether the two courts that upheld
the admission of the testimony would have done the same had the child not been
retarded.
322 1 J. ZISKIN, COPING WrrH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TEsTIMoNY 3 (3d. ed.
1981); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693, 737 (1974); Comment, The Psychologist as Expert Witness:
Science in the Courtroom? 38 MD. L. REv. 539, 561 (1979).
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ble. Understandability will also vary depending upon the abstract-
ness of the conclusion. The testimony would generally do well on
the importance factor because it would not, if believed, be disposi-
tive or virtually dispositive of the case.
The second possible form of enhancing testimony with respect
to the capabilities of a child witness is testimony not focused on the
abilities of the particular complainant, but on the abilities of chil-
dren in general. The topics on which testimony of this nature might
be offered are suggested by the discussion of the kinds of prejudices
that adults may have against child witnesses. 323 Examples of such
testimony would be that children are no more likely to lie as wit-
nesses than are adults, that children's memory by and large is not
inferior to that of adults, that children are no more suggestible than
adults, and that children are particularly susceptible to being
tripped up on cross-examination by leading and complex questions
even if they are telling the truth.
There is only one reported case in which testimony along these
lines has been offered. 324 In that case, a psychologist testified that
he had examined the complaintant and had come to the conclusion
that she was evasive in that she was not telling everything that had
happened. He went on to testify, however, that "a lot of times chil-
dren become very honest when they come into a courtroom ..... 325
The appellate court, with no discussion, held that the quoted testi-
mony was "admissible and relevant.
'326
The admissibility of general ability testimony is a close question
under the four-factor balancing test. While the necessity is high be-
cause the opponent is seeking to highlight a defect in the child wit-
ness, the reliability of most of these assertions has not been
established because of the embryonic nature of the research. The
testimony, however, is likely to be understandable, and also fares
well on the importance factor, since due to its general nature, even
if it is believed it would not be dispositive of the case.
Behavioral scientific researchers seem to be interested in the
topic of the capabilities of child witnesses. Perhaps in the near fu-
ture behavioral scientific research will make clearer what types of
assertions regarding child witnesses are reliable and what type are
not. This is certainly an area that warrants further consideration by
both behavioral scientists and prosecutors.
323 See supra text accompanying notes 241-63.
324 State v. Snapp, 110 Idaho 269, 715 P.2d 939 (1986).
325 Id. at-, 715 P.2d at 941.
326 Id. at-, 715 P.2d at 941.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This article has demonstrated that there is a crying need for
courts to recognize that with respect to expert testimony about child
complainants in sexual abuse prosecutions the key inquiry is
whether the testimony will assist the trier of fact. Courts must adopt
a reasoned mode of analysis on that issue that will consider all perti-
nent factors and lead to well-reasoned results. The four-factor bal-
ancing analysis proposed by this article encompasses all of the
concerns that have been raised by courts in this area.
With respect to the types of expert opinion testimony that have
been offered regarding child sexual abuse complainants, the four-
factor balancing test produces varying results. An expert diagnosis
that a child is the victim of sexual abuse offered to prove that abuse
occurred should not be admitted because the testimony is not de-
monstrably reliable, may be difficult to effectively cross-examine or
otherwise put into proper perspective and, if believed, will be dis-
positive or virtually dispositive of the case. The use of an expert's
testimony vouching for the complainant's credibility by the opinion
that the complainant is telling the truth should also be inadmissible
for the same reasons. An expert's vouching for the complainant's
credibility by an opinion that it is rare for a child to fabricate or
fantasize a claim of sexual abuse should not be admitted because of
its tendency to overwhelm the jury on the key issue in the case.
However, use of an expert opinion to enhance the complainant's
credibility by explaining the complainant's unusual behavior should
be admissible because generally the defendant has made this testi-
mony necessary and it is not, even if believed, dispositive or virtually
dispositive of the case. This article also suggests that another type
of expert opinion used to enhance the complainant's credibility, by
explaining either the capabilities of the particular child or the capa-
bilities of children in general as witnesses, may be available to
prosecutors.
This article also highlights an urgent need for research con-
cerning exactly what jurors think about child witnesses in general,
what preconceptions they have about child sexual abuse cases, and
how children compare with adults as witnesses. Fortunately, it
seems that behavioral scientists are interested in pursuing studies in
this area, thus, more definitive answers to these questions may soon
be available.
Child sexual abuse is a major problem in the United States.
Such abuse is repugnant, and the increased zeal with which child
sexual abusers are being prosecuted is laudable. Justice demands,
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however, that convictions be obtained on the basis of properly ad-
missible evidence. Accordingly, it is the hope of this author that this
article will contribute to just and reasoned decisions on the part of
courts faced with questions concerning the admissibility of expert
testimony about child complainants in sexual abuse cases.
